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INTRODUCTION

Do you believe in mediation?' That may seem like an odd question. Normally one thinks of "believing in" (or having faith in) things
1. In mediation, mediators help the disputants (and, if applicable, their attorneys) reach agreement. Although there are considerable variations in mediation
practice, see John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839, 848-54 (1997), there are some distinctive
generally-recognized features, as these procedures are typically practiced in the U.S.
these days. The process often involves an issue-by-issue discussion directed by the
mediator. If the parties do not agree, mediators do not have formal authority to impose a resolution. Thus there is no guarantee that a dispute will be resolved through
mediation. The formal features of parties' active participation and consent give mediation an aura of party control. Some observers challenge the notion of party control in
actual practice and suggest that mediators sometimes or often use subtle or not so
subtle manipulation. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1585-94 (1991); David Greatbatch & Robert
Dingwall, Selective Facilitation:Some PreliminaryObservations on a Strategy Used
by Divorce Mediators, 23 L. & Soc'y REv. 613 (1989); Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth
Kressel, Conclusion: The Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN TALx WoRKS:
PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 459, 459-60 (Deborah M. Kolb ed., 1994).
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like magic, God, or the market. These are typically things that are
beyond verifiable human knowledge (such as magic and God) and/or
deeply held values (such as whether the market is a better mechanism than government for managing the flow of goods and services).
At first blush, one might not think that mediation would fall into
either category. There have been numerous empirical studies about
many different aspects of mediation, so one can confidently say, for
example, that mediation participants generally perceive that the process and outcomes of mediation are fair and generally are satisfied
2
with the process.
I suspect that for most people, belief in mediation refers to the
value of mediation as a dispute resolution technique (particularly in
comparison with the value of litigation). Belief in mediation, then,
may be like belief in the market. There is an immense amount of
research on the functioning of the market, yet experts sharply disagree in their interpretations and predictions about how it functions,
not to mention the relative values of market and government systems
of economic management. There is such complexity and scope of extraneous variables affecting both mediation and economic systems
that presumably no amount of empirical research would ever settle
these debates. For many people, such beliefs may become matters of
faith, i.e., deeply-held convictions that are largely impervious to careful analysis of evidence. 3 I suggest that they are ideologies based on
faith to a considerable extent. Indeed, understanding belief in mediation by many people is likely to require one to transcend assumptions

Disputants may undertake mediation by contract, either when entering a transaction (e.g., by a clause in a contract providing for mediation in the event of a dispute)
or after a dispute arises. In addition, courts are requiring parties increasingly to use
mediation before they can get a court trial. Court planners often develop these "courtannexed" mediation programs intending to reduce courts' caseloads, backlog of cases,
and operating costs. These programs are also often suggested to reduce litigants' time
and expense and increase their satisfaction. See generally ELZAEmT PLPiNGEa &
MARnnExT SHAw, COURT ADR: ]LEmNTs OF PROGRAzs DESIGN (1992).
2. See Craig McEwen, Note on Mediation Research, in DisPUTE RESOLUTION : NE.
GOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 182-83 (Stephen B. Goldberg et al. 3d
ed. 1999); John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing:We Do Not Know What
We Think and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 DFN. U. L. REv. 499, 529, 532-33
(1989).
3. One definition of faith is "complete confidence or trust." WEBSTER's DESK DicTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

322 (1990). This is not intended to imply that

belief based on empirical analysis is necessarily superior to that based on faith or
other epistemologies.
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that it is simply based on cool analysis of advantages and disadvantages. This study is intended to examine a wide range of factors that
4
give rise to (or at least relate to) belief in mediation.
In the 1980s and 1990s, ADR 5 in general, and mediation in particular, 6 became things that people do (or don't) believe in on a technical and, especially, ideological level. Proponents believe that "it"
"works" and it is good. 7 Indeed, there are "true believers" who profess
4. This research cannot give rise to strong claims of causality of belief in mediation, though the results are certainly suggestive about causal factors. For discussion
of limits of causal interpretation of these results, see infra Part VI.
5. The term "ADR" probably did not even exist in the late 1970s. By the late
1980s, the term had become so widely accepted that it seemed too late to change it
despite dissatisfaction with it by many people in the dispute resolution world. See
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and
Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 DEN. U. L. Rav. 335, 342-45 (1989); Madeleine Crohn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Buzzwords or Movement?, 51 TEX. B. J.
1143, 1144 (1988). The acronym "ADR" originally stood for "alternative dispute resolution," referring to dispute resolution procedures that were alternatives to litigation.
In recent years, some people have used the term to mean "appropriatedispute resolution," suggesting either that non-litigation procedures are presumptively most appropriate or that decision-makers should be given a choice of procedures from which to
select the most appropriate one for particular cases. Some have used the term referring to assistedor affordable dispute resolution. See Archie Zariski, Lawyers and Dispute Resolution: What Do They Think And Know (And Think They Know)? - Finding
Out Through Survey Research, 4 E Law - Murdoch University Electronic Journal of
Law (June 1997) (visited Mar. 23, 2000) <http'/www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/
v4n2/zaris422.html> (survey of 418 attorneys in Western Australia with 16% response rate). Some prefer simply to use the term "dispute resolution," referring to all
dispute resolution procedures, including litigation. While these distinctions are quite
meaningful in some contexts, as a practical matter, whatever the definition, the term
"ADR" is generally used to refer to a set of dispute resolution procedures, principally
including mediation and arbitration, though also including a wide range of other procedures such as early neutral evaluation, summary jury trials, and ombuds work. See
generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIA.
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (3d ed. 1999). For the purpose of this Article, the precise
meaning of ADR is not as significant as the fact that the term has a widely accepted
meaning and that people commonly identify as believing in it or not.
6. While arbitration has predominated in the ADR field in the U.S. for much of
the twentieth century, there has been increasing interest in mediation in recent decades. This is reflected by references to mediation by commentators as the "rising
star in the ADR galaxy." Ellen E. Deason, Allerton House Conference '98: Confronting
and Embracing Changes in the Practice of Law, 86 ILL. B.J. 628, 632 (1998). While
this quote may well reflect the current relative ideological popularity of mediation, I
suspect that arbitration may still be used more frequently, partly because of its longer
history of institutionalization in certain sectors such as construction and unionized
labor grievances.
7. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challengingthe Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairnessin Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317
(1995); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EmpoWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994); Joshua

D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 467 (1991); Andrew W.
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their faith in it and proselytize at professional gatherings.8 Opponents sometimes challenge claims about how well it works or argue
that, even if it does "work" in some respects, it produces adverse sideeffects that outweigh any benefits. 9 Thus, it has become perfectly
normal to state (or ask) whether one is a believer in ADR or mediation. This is captured quite well in the following excerpt from an interview with a lawyer for this study:
My experience has been, for example, with large corporations,
in-house legal departments have sort of gotten the word that
"ADR is something we need to think about. It's important." So
one of the things people are always asking your firm is, "What
experience do you have in ADR? Are you believers in ADR?"' 0
Arguments about mediation (and ADR generally) have been carried out in the scholarly and professional literature by scholars and
professional opinion leaders.' Similar, but perhaps briefer, conversations play out in circles of regular dispute handlers such as lawyers
and business executives. Some people are quite enthusiastic and
"talk it up," encouraging others to use it more in their own cases.
Other people have reservations about using ADR procedures and
may criticize the procedures or discourage using them in particular
cases.
Why do some people become believers in mediation and others do
not? This article presents the results of a study addressing that question, particularly for those who handle disputes rather than those
MeThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, ForReconciliation,94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985); Janice
A. Roehl & Royer F. Cook, Issues in Mediation:Rhetoric and Reality Revisited, 41 J.
Soc. IssuEs 161 (1985); Richard Danzig & Michael J. Lowy, Everyday Disputes and
Mediation in the United States:A Reply to ProfessorFelstiner,10 L. & Soc'y Rsv. 675
(1975).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 225-27.
9. See, e.g., Grllo, supra note 1; Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring
Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETMICS 553 (1995); Austin
Sarat, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Wrong Solution, Wrong Problem, 37 P1oc.
AcAD. POL. SCi. 162 (1988); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 62 Tum. L. REv. 1 (1987); Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand
Informality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudicein Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985
Wisc. L. Rzv. 1359 (1985); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
10. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994). See infra Part III for a
description of the methodology of this study.
I frequently hear professions of belief in mediation when I talk with people who,
knowing of my interest in mediation, often express their belief in (or occasionally
doubts about) mediation.
11. See supra notes 7-8, which reflect only a tiny portion of the literature that has
developed around ADR and mediation.
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who mostly theorize about them. The article focuses on belief in mediation because it does seem to be the rising star of the current ADR
era. 12
To provide a context for the results of this study, Part II of this
article describes the growth of mediation during the current ADR era
and some possible reasons for the growth, based on sociological theories of law, organizations, and the professions. Part III describes the
methodology of the study, and Part IV describes the organizational
settings where respondents work, their professional and disputing
experience, and their sources of information about ADR. Respondents in this study are outside counsel with commercial practices, inside counsel in business firms, and business executives. Parts V and
VI provide detailed analyses of the data collected in this study. Part
V analyzes the respondents' belief in mediation, views about ADR,
expectations about consequences of ADR for them personally, and
their perceptions of the opinions of influential people in their lives
about ADR. To provide a fuller understanding of these views, Part VI
examines factors associated with the respondents' belief in
mediation.
Part VII summarizes the findings of this study, noting the major
similarities in responses between the three types of respondents, as
well as the differences. All three types of respondents generally "believe in" mediation and have favorable views of mediation on a variety of measures. They are generally satisfied with their mediation
experiences, but they generally do not believe that ADR would help
them personally, and expectations about potential personal benefits
are not associated with belief in mediation. Most respondents believe
that their organizational superiors, leaders in their profession, and
top corporate executives have favorable views of mediation and ADR.
Although respondents generally believe that mediation often saves
time and money as compared with traditional litigation, their belief
in mediation seems to be most strongly related to perceptions that
12. Although this article focuses primarily on mediation, interviews in this study
did not include separate and parallel questions on many topics about different ADR
procedures (e.g., separate questions about expected effects of mediation and arbitration) due to time limitations. Some questions refer to aspects of ADR generally and
mediation specifically, depending on how much respondents were expected to distinguish the procedures in answering the question. As a result, the questions and answers-and thus the discussion in this article-do not all focus exclusively on
mediation. This may, indeed, reflect actual patterns of opinions, which combine beliefs about different ADR procedures about some matters, separate them about other
matters, and confuse them about yet others. Given the actual and perceived differences between ADR procedures, it would be desirable to include separate questions on
mediation and arbitration in future research.
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mediation helps preserve relationships and that business' top executives are often satisfied with the results in suits where mediation is
used, especially relative to suits where mediation is not used. For the
attorneys, belief in mediation is also associated with satisfaction with
their experiences with ADR and perceptions that their organizational
superiors have favorable opinions about ADR. For the executives, belief in mediation is associated with perceptions that their professional leaders have favorable opinions about ADR.
Part VIII discusses the implications of the findings, including
theoretical interpretations of the findings, offers possible strategies
for mediation proponents, and cautions about potential problems
with continued institutionalization of mediation. The responses in
this study are consistent with patterns of institutionalization that
are initially driven by calculation of perceived technical advantages
of innovations and eventually shift to routinized processes of conformity with key actors in professional and organizational networks
in pursuit of increased legitimacy. Based on this analysis of institutionalization of mediation, mediation proponents should take measures to assure satisfaction by mediation participants (particularly
mediation practices encouraging good relationships), promote courtordered mediation, and advocate for rules requiring attorneys to consult with clients about ADR options. Part VIII includes cautions
about institutionalization processes, including the potential for dysfunctional transformation of mediation practices during the process
of routinizing mediation, as well as unexpected deinstitutionalization.
Finally, Part IX considers whether belief in mediation is part of a
larger "process pluralist" ideology consisting of an interrelated set of
beliefs that embrace the availability and acceptability of a wide range
of goals, norms, procedures, results, professional roles, skills, and
styles in handling disputes involving legal issues. While this study
cannot directly answer that question, it does suggest that the existence, shape, and diffusion of such an ideology could shape dispute
resolution practices for decades to come. Part IX also suggests that
continued institutionalization of mediation may require a balance of
true believers in mediation and more qualified believers, and that
signals sent through professional and organizational channels may
be critical in continued diffusion (or contraction) of belief in mediation by key actors.
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ADR ERA

A. Expansion of ADR Practiceand Ideology
Since the 1960s and 1970s, there has been a remarkable growth
in the ADR field. During this current ADR era, 13 visionaries have
proposed the creation of ambitious "new" structures for dispute handling and lawyers and other professionals have devised innovative
disputing procedures. 14 For example, numerous neighborhood mediation' 5 and court-annexed ADR 16 programs have been established
around the U.S. Formal associations of practitioners have been organized within specific fields like family mediation, as well as interdisciplinary organizations dealing with dispute resolution that
operate on local, state, national, and international levels. 17 Major
foundations have provided ADR programs with substantial support,
13. Although the term ADR was probably coined in recent decades, histories of
disputing in the U.S. have shown that there has been a gradual accumulation of disputing forums outside the traditional court process going back to the earliest times in
US history. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983). Re-

forms such as juvenile courts, small claims courts, labor arbitration, and commercial
arbitration have been added over a long period to address relatively narrow sets of
problems. Indeed, the problems prompting each of these reforms prior to the current
ADR era were relatively small in the context of the overall court system. Lawyers,
judges, and legislators responded to the problems with piecemeal solutions. See id.;
CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZA.
TION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION
PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 20-32 (2d ed. 1996); Cathe-

rine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming:Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L.
REv. 847 (1996).
Jeffrey Stempel suggests that the 1976 Pound Conference is an appropriate point
to mark the beginning of the modern ADR movement. Stempel argues that "new
ADR" is more likely than "old ADR" to involve, among other things, mass-produced
procedures affecting large classes of persons or entities. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on JudicialADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli,
Failed Overture, or FledglingAdulthood?, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 297, 309
n.32, 334-40 (1996).
14. See, e.g., Richard Danzig, Toward Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of CriminalJustice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Edgar S. Calm & Jean C.
Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW
927 (1966).
15.

See Roehl & Cook, supra note 7; HARRINGTON, supra note 13. The National

Association for Community Mediation's 1997 Annual Report estimates that there are
more than 550 community mediation centers in the United States. National Association for Community Mediation (visited Aug. 15, 1999) <http:J/www.nafcm.org/
annual.html>.
16. See PLAPiNGER & SHAW, supra note 1.
17.

See Mediation Information Resource Center, Mediation Organizations (vis-

ited Aug. 15, 1999) <http'//www.mediate.com/organize/knownorg.cfm>.
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and practitioners and scholars have produced voluminous literatures.1 8 Mass communication media have publicized the existence,
benefits, and problems of ADR processes.
Evidence of public (or at least major government and business)
support for ADR includes: (1) the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,
which authorize federal courts to develop ADR programs, 19 (2) the
spread of procedures by which courts routinely refer substantial proportions of their cases to various disputing mechanisms, 20 (3) funding
of ADR programs by state and local governments through direct appropriations and court filing fees, 2 1 and (4) the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution's campaign starting in 1983 to solicit pledges from
large corporations (and more recently, law firms) to consider using
22
ADR disputing procedures.
Figure 1 demonstrates a surge in state legislation regarding
ADR in the 1980s. 2 3 The volume of legislation has probably grown
18. See Esser, supra note 2, at 499-501; Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute
Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship:From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the JuridicalSubject, 66 DEN. U. L. Rv. 437, 445 (1989). The William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation probably has the largest foundation conflict resolution
program. In 1998, it awarded millions of dollars of grants for theory development,
practitioner organizations, consensus building, public participation, policymaking, international conflict resolution, "emerging issues," and development of the field generally. William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, 1998 Conflict Resolution Grants(visited
Aug. 31, 1999) <http'J/www.hewlett.org>.
19. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 105 Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993. The
1998 Act states, "Each United States district court shall devise and implement its
own alternative dispute resolution program... to encourage and promote the use of
alternative dispute resolution in its district."
20. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LANW, Poucy & PRACTICE §§6:04, 7:01-:02 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
21. See PLAPINGER & SuAw, supra note 1, at 43-55.
22. Approximately 4,000 operating companies and 1,500 law firms have signed
the CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation. The corporate
pledge states, in part:
In the event of a business dispute between our company and another company which has made or will then make a similar statement, we are prepared
to explore with that other party resolution of the dispute through negotiation
or ADR techniques before pursuing litigation.
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http'J/www.cpradr.org/
pledgeslitmi>.
For an account of the CPR pledge campaign, see Cronin-Harris, supra note 13, at
862-63.
23. See STANDING Cohm. ON DisPUTE RESOLUTION, AmEIuCAN BAR ASS'N, LEGisLATION ON DisPUT RESOLUTION: 1990/1991 ADDENDUm To
STATE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION MONOGRAPH 80 fig. (1992).

THE

1989

FEDiiL AND
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even more in the 1990s. 24 Figure 2 illustrates how ideas and information about ADR have been diffused within the community of legal
practitioners. The American Bar Association, which has been promoting ADR use, published substantial numbers of articles in the
ABA Journal going back at least to the early 1980s. While the
number of items peaked in the early 1980s and again in the mid
1990s, dipping in the late 1980s, the ABA Journal has generally included an average of two to three items per month for more than the
past 15 years. The legal press, as reflected by national publications
like American Lawyer, noticeably increased their coverage in the
early 1990s. 2 5 This diffusion pattern of stories about ADR reflects an
initial burst of activity by professional organizations and government
entities followed, with some lag, by news coverage in the legal press
of bar association activities and ADR usage.

Figure 1.Number of State ADR Statutes Enacted, 1980-1991
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24. One and one half volumes of Rogers and McEwen's two-volume treatise are
devoted to mediation legislation. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 20, at apps. AC.
25. The data in Figure 2 are based on searches of the NEXIS database for items
including the terms "mediation," "arbitration," "alternative dispute resolution," and
"ADR." To focus on the current ADR era, the search excluded articles that included
the term "union." These articles were excluded because resolution of labor disputes is
a somewhat distinct area that is largely a product of earlier ADR eras. The NEXIS
database for the American Lawyer begins with monthly issues published in 1987.
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Figure 2. References to ADR in Legal Publications. 1982-1993
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The current wave of ADR developments seems much broader
than prior waves 26 in that it is not limited to small and confined parts
of the disputing world. Rather, the current wave is intended to
change what some might consider the "heartland" of disputing,
touching virtually all types of disputes and disputants. Although it is
hard to fully document the growth of ADR in quantitative terms, it
seems clear that the current wave of ADR has grown very rapidly.
I submit that this growth in ADR is closely linked to the diffusion
of an ideology 2 7 supporting this expansion. I suggest that this is a
kind of legal pluralist ideology that supported the expansion of ADR
activities-and particularly mediation-during the current ADR era.
This pluralist ideology, which I call "process pluralism," challenges
an ideology of legal centralism that has been widely accepted within
the legal profession. 28 The propositions in both ideologies combine
descriptive and normative elements. They reflect what is thought to
be, in fact, normal, and they express what is believed to be the appro29
priate shape of reality.
26. See supra note 13.
27. In this article, the term "ideology" is used to refer to a system of related beliefs used to understand and interpret social action. See From the Special Issue Editors, 22 L. & Soc'y REv. 629 (1988). Although the term "ideology" sometimes has
pejorative connotations, I use the term descriptively in this article, without intent to
praise or condemn particular ideologies or their adherents.
28. For definition and description of process pluralist ideology, see infra text accompanying notes 35-42. In brief, this ideology holds that many different features of
disputing processes-such as goals, norms, procedures, results, professional roles,

skills, and styles in handling disputes-can be manipulated and customized for each
dispute.

29. See Marc Galanter, The Portable Soc 2; or, What to Do Until the Doctrine
Comes, in GENERAL EDUCATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLEcTIONS ON
THE COLLEGE OF TBE UNrvEsrrY OF CHiCAGO 246, 253 (J. J. MacAloon ed., 1992).
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A legal centralist ideology holds that the courts, the law, and
lawyers are the primary means for handling disputes involving legal
issues. 30 Under this worldview, government is the principal locus of
legal controls, operating through a court system. This system is a
coherent structure consisting of a hierarchical set of courts in which
each court acts according to prescribed and universal rules to achieve
specified instrumental purposes that reflect widely shared values.
The courts follow the direction of higher authorities to announce, apply, and sometimes change rules. Professionals trained in the law
are needed to staff the courts and represent disputants. The proto31
typical mode of legal action is adjudication.
Over time, problems developed with legal centralist theory and
practice. 3 2 The problems were perceived as relatively small anomalies that did not fundamentally threaten the core of legal centralist
ideology. It was still generally taken for granted that handling
problems socially defined as "legal disputes" normally meant "litigotiation,"3 3 if not adjudication, in government courts and agencies or
in their shadows.3 4 Indeed, many of the innovations consisted of new
varieties of government courts such as small claims, juvenile, and
family courts.
As problems with legal centralist theory and practice accumulated, however, it became difficult to accommodate the "fixes" within
legal centralist ideology. I suggest that a "process pluralist" ideology 35 evolved to address these problems. 36 This ideology is hypothesized to consist of an interrelated set of beliefs that embrace the
30. See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism,22 L. & Soc'y REy. 869, 889 (1988).
31. See generally Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1,1 (1981); Galanter, supra note 29,
at 250-53.
32. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 13, at 138-47. He writes:
So we are possessed of vastly more laws and lawyers than any other society;
we are also more concerned with lawlessness than any other people. The
more laws we have, of course, the more laws will be broken; the more we then
need the services of courts; the more congested the legal system becomes; the
more we yearn for alternatives ....
Id. at 141-42.
33. Galanter defines litigotiation as "the strategic pursuit of a settlement
through mobilizing the court process." Marc Galanter, World of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
34. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-72 (1979).
35. Robert A. Baruch Bush uses the term "process pluralism" referring to advocacy of a technocratic process of optimizing the matching of disputes with disputing
mechanisms. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation,3 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1989).
The quintessential manifestations of these schemes are the "Multi-Door Courthouses"
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availability and acceptability of a wide range of goals, norms, procedures, results, professional roles, skills, and styles in handling disputes involving legal issues. The essence of this ideology is that
many different features of disputing processes can be manipulated
and customized for each dispute. This might be done by disputants
themselves or those who might be considered "disputing technicians"
(including lawyers, judges, mediators, court planners and administrators, and others).
A key element of process pluralism is the belief in the legitimacy
of a multiplicity of disputing mechanisms. In addition to trials in
government courts, it accepts the legitimacy of diverse disputing procedures and providers including, for example, neighborhood mediation centers, private "rent-a-judges," all-purpose private court
systems, university tribunals, and automobile manufacturers' procedures for handling consumer warranty complaints.3 7 This ideology
also recognizes and accepts a wide assortment of values along a range
of other dimensions, including values of the traditional legal system,

in several cities in which court personnel assess cases filed in court and make referrals to different disputing mechanisms. My meaning is much broader than Bush's:
under my usage, the ideology does not necessarily take any position regarding the
feasibility or desirability of such matching processes. Although some who hold a process pluralist ideology (as I define it) undoubtedly are committed to such matching
schemes, people may accept the legitimacy of multiple disputing procedures without
having an opinion about matching schemes.
Process pluralism is somewhat similar to what Merry calls the "new legal pluralism." Generally, legal pluralism is "a situation in which two or more legal systems
coexist in the same social field." Merry, supra note 30, at 870. Merry distinguishes
the new legal pluralism from "classical legal pluralism," which focused on colonial and
postcolonial societies, analyzing the relationships between the law of colonizers and
the colonized. In contrast, new legal pluralism has focused on law in non-colonized
societies, analyzing unofficial forms of ordering and relations between dominant and
subordinate groups. Although there is some overlap between the concepts of the new
legal pluralism and process pluralism, there are also differences. For example, new
legal pluralism is more likely to focus on truly informal mechanisms such as arguments in a bar or corporate gossip than is process pluralism, which focuses primarily
on mechanisms such as arbitration or mini-trials using more explicit and deliberate
norms and procedures. See Galanter, supra note 31, at 18. In addition, the distinction between state law and non-state law is of major importance for legal pluralism,
see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism,
20 J. L. & Soc'y 192, 193 (1993), but has limited significance for process pluralism.
36. Cf. THoms S. KumN, THE STRucruRE OF ScIrErNIc RE OLUTONS 66-110 (2d
ed. 1970).
37. See Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and PublicAuthority, 12
STuD. n L. POL. & Soc'y 393, 400-07 (1992).
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but does not presumptively favor the traditional values. 38 For example, a process pluralist ideology accepts the validity of various norms
used in resolving disputes-such as economic norms, ethical
precepts, and other cultural beliefs-as well as those expressed in
legal rules. It promotes consideration of many different disputing
outcomes in addition to judicial monetary and injunctive remedies,
including promotion of behavior, relationships, and outcomes beyond
the legal and practical reach of the courts.3 9 It conceives of an array
of professional roles for lawyers, including some roles in which lawyers do not exercise predominant decision-making authority over disputants, non-legal professionals, and non-professionals. 40 Under this
view, non-lawyers may be more appropriate to manage resolution of
some disputes than lawyers. It recognizes different negotiation styles
and strategies, 4 1 such as what Kritzer calls an "appropriate-result,
consensus-oriented" strategy focusing on parties' interests, in addition to a more traditional "maximal-result, concessions-oriented"
strategy. 4 2 In contrast to pure legal centralist ideology, which makes
a strong assumption that law, lawyers, legal remedies, and courts
should predominate in legal disputes, process pluralist ideology challenges all those assumptions. Thus, for at least a group of ADR practitioners and visionaries, ADR is more than an incremental technical
innovation; rather, it reflects a major change in their ideology of
disputing.
38. This account describes general values that I believe cluster together logically
and perhaps empirically. Nonetheless, there are certainly differences between believers in process pluralist ideology. For example, there is a range of opinion among believers about the traditional legal system with some believers expressing hostility
about it and with others being more neutral or favorable. Even those expressing hostility presumably recognize some value in maintaining the traditional system and using it in some cases. Whether there is, in fact, a coherent process pluralist ideology is
discussed infra in Part IX.
39. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 794-829 (1984).
40. One aspect of changing professional roles and relationships, particularly involving attorneys, is a trend to requiring attorneys to advise clients about ADR options. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 20, at §4:03; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal
Representation and the Next Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for
the Failureto Allow the Client to Control Negotiation and PursueAlternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 819 (1990); Frank E. A. Sander, At Issue: Professional
Responsibility, Should There Be a Duty to Advise of ADR Options? Yes: An Aid to
Clients, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 50.
41. See generally DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONs (1989) (detailing different negotiation strategies).
42. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET's MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 122-23 (1991).
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During the current ADR era, perceived problems with the court
system had already accumulated as described above. In and around
the legal profession, critiques of legal centralist ideology were advanced by "institutional entrepreneurs" including judges and other
public officials, bar association committees and leaders, ADR service
providers, business associations, foundation officials, and sociolegal
scholars.4 These institutional entrepreneurs articulated and enacted legitimating justifications of a process pluralist ideology such
as the definition of standards of ethics and professional conduct and
specialties of dispute resolution expertise, identification of advantages of ADR procedures compared with court adjudication, and the
creation of consumer and state demand for ADR services." These
justifications claimed a large number of potential benefits, including
time and cost savings, preservation of relationships, and better-quality outcomes, among many others. 45 As process pluralist theories diffused through the general public, and especially relevant professional
communities, fewer people took it for granted that the court system
was "the only way" to handle situations defined as legal disputes.
Presumably, awareness of problems, development of "new" solutions,
and formulation of legitimating theories repeatedly reinforced each
46
other, thus perpetuating the diffusion process.
This article examines the extent to which mediation has become
accepted by important populations of disputants and legal advocates.
Belief in the legitimacy of ADR, and mediation in particular, is a key
indicator of process pluralism. Thus, this article focuses on factors
that help explain why people may believe in mediation to a greater or
lesser extent. Before describing the methodology and findings of the
study, the article will summarize sociological theories explaining diffusion of innovations generally.
B. Sociological Theories Explaining Diffusion of ADR Practices
and Ideology
This Part describes theories in the sociology of law, organizations, and professions relevant to the diffusion of process pluralist
ideology or, at least, increased belief in mediation. The sociology of
43. See Silbey &Sarat, supra note 18, at 445.

44. See generally PIAPINGER

& SH.Aw,

supra note 1.

45. See GOLDBERG T AL., supra note 5, at 8.
46. See generally Walter W. Powell, Expanding the Scope of InstitutionalAnalysis, in TnE NEw INST1mUONALmSM iN ORGANmZTIONAL ANALYSts 183, 201 (Walter. W.
Powell & Paul. J. Dilaggio eds., 1991) (describing cyclical processes of institutional
reproduction).
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law has long been concerned with the production and dissemination
of knowledge. "The law" itself is a form of knowledge that is circulated by legislatures, courts, and other rulemaking bodies. 4 7 The notion of the "shadow of the law" described by Mnookin and Kornhauser
refers to dispersal of legal knowledge through society. Although most
disputes are resolved through private negotiation rather than court
adjudication, Mnookin and Kornhauser show how the law creates socially recognized "bargaining endowments"-typically evaluated and
communicated by lawyers-that profoundly affect this private ordering.4s Further analysis describes a two-way process in which the law
also operates in the "shadow of indigenous ordering," i.e., where extralegal norms are introduced into legal systems and affect legal
norms and processes. 4 9 Sociolegal scholars have devoted a great deal
of attention to the generation, transformation, and distribution of understanding about law and disputing by a wide range of social actors
5 1 judges, 5 2
including members of the general public, 50 police,
mediators, 53 and especially lawyers as counselors and agents of their
clients. 54 Much of this literature highlights how people often respond
to legal matters based on normal and recurrent features of situations
47. Thus Galanter writes, for example, "[Ilt appears that the impact of adjudication is accomplished primarily through the transmission and reception of information
rather than through the direct imposition of controls." Marc Galanter, Adjudication,
Litigation,and Related Phenomena, in LAw AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151, 219 (Leon
Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). See also Richard Lempert, More Tales of Two
Courts:Exploring Changes in the "DisputeSettlement Function"of Trial Courts, 13 L.
& Soc'y REv. 91, 99 (1978).
48. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 34, at 968-69.
49. See Galanter, supra note 31, at 17-27 (citing, among others, studies of how
standard-setting by a hospital accreditation body contributed to the erosion of the
doctrine of charitable immunity and how informal relations between automobile manufacturers and their dealers contributed to the development of legal machinery for
resolving their disputes).
50. See, e.g., William L. F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformationof
Disputes:Naming, Blaming, Claiming... , 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-81); Tom R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 51 (1990); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey,
Conformity, Contestation,and Resistance:An Account of Legal Consciousness,26 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 731 (1992).
51. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966).
52. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil
Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 256 (1986).
53. See, e.g., Peter Adler et al., The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement's Own
Story, 10 L. & POL'Y 317 (1988); THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY
OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES

eds., 1993);

(Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner
(Deborah M. Kolb et al. eds.,

WHEN TALK WoRKs: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS

1994)

54. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND
THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995); Mark Suchman,
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more than express criteria of law or social policy. 55 For example,
Ross shows how automobile claims adjusters and personal injury
lawyers regularly rely on folk conceptions in their day-to-day determinations of liability and damages in ways that are quite different
than prescribed by the doctrines of negligence law.i6 A very common
distinction in a wide range of settings is whether a matter is considered "routine" (and thus treatable using simple rules-of-thumb) or
whether the matter falls outside the ambit of such routine processing
7
and thus requires more careful analysis.6
Institutional theories of organizations examine processes of how
conceptions become taken-for-granted notions having a "rule-like status in social thought and action."5 8 Institutional theorists typically
focus on cognitive and cultural explanations in which individuals act
based more on assumptions about appropriateness than on calculations for goal achievement that form the basis of rational-actor theories. Taken-for-granted understandings of the social world, rather
than highly self-conscious analyses, are considered the prototypical
On Advice of Counsel- Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley 95-126 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University, on file with author); Howard S. Erlanger et al., Par.
ticipation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: CautionsFrom the Divorce Context,
21 L. & Soc'y REV. 585, 587 (1987); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and ConsumerProtection Laws, 14 L. & Soc'y Rv. 115, 141 (1979); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice
of Law as Confidence Game. OrganizationalCooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & Soc'y
Rav. 15 (1967).
55. See Susan S. Silbey, A Sociological Interpretationof the RelationshipBetween
Law and Society, in

LAw AND THE ORDERING OF OUR

LiFE TOGETHER 1, 12-13 (Richard

J. Neuhaus ed., 1989).
56. See H. LAURENCE Ross,

SETTLED OUT OF CoUTw. THE SocIAL PRocEss OF INSURANCE CLAnis ADJusTmrENT 87-135 (2d ed. 1980).

57. See, eg., id.; David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: SociologicalFeatures of the Penal Code in a PublicDefender Office, 12 Soc. PROBs. 255 (1965); Stewart Macaulay,
Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 Ar.t. Soc. Ray. 55
(1963).
58. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction,in THE NEW INsirrTox.
ANALYsis 1, 7-9 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds.,

ALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL

1991). Professional licensing is an example of a rule-like structure that is presumably
intended to ensure competent service, though it is an indirect and often ineffective
means of doing so. Similarly, various business innovations (such as quality circles, to
name just one) are presumably intended to promote profitability, but again are loosely
linked to actual production efficiencies. They become institutions as people take
them for granted as proper and effective measures, typically without continued consideration of their actual efficacy. Though popular conceptions often focus on institutions as organizational structures, most scholarly analyses are much broader,
including generally recognized norms, roles, and conventions. Thus, institutions may
range "from handshakes to marriages to strategic-planning departments" and may
cover "a wide territorial range, from understandings within a single family to myths
of rationality and progress in the world system." Id
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form of cognitive functioning. Legitimacy, rather than efficiency, is
generally viewed as the primary engine driving social interaction.5 9
Thus, people are considered as acting primarily based on standards of
obligation as defined in their particular cultural and historical contexts. "Institutionalized arrangements are reproduced because individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives (or
because they regard as unrealistic alternatives they can imagine)." e°
Thus, in the disputing context, for example, after a mediation program becomes deeply institutionalized, people mediate cases because
that is how broad classes of cases are handled rather than because of
careful case-by-case assessments.
Recent work on institutional theory focuses on how professions,
governments, educational institutions, and other legitimating enterprises generate abstract cognitive models that form the basis for lessthan-conscious conformity (or "isomorphism") by individuals and organizations. 6 1 In particular, DiMaggio and Powell argue that "normative isomorphism" is an important mechanism of institutional
diffusion. 62 Normative isomorphism entails legitimation of cognitive
models by university specialists and the diffusion of such models
through professional networks. Professional networks are often considered to play an especially important role in the diffusion of innovations. 63 Such networks are important in institutional theory for at
least two related reasons. First, these networks constitute important
channels for diffusion of institutional practices and beliefs through
59.

See James G. March, Decisions in Organizationsand Theories of Choice, in

PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATION DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR 205, 221-226 (Andrew H. Van

de Ven & W. F. Joyce eds., 1981); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron
Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 A. Soc. REV. 147, 148 (1983). For attempts to integrate differing
theoretical perspectives, see Paul J. DiMaggio, Interest and Agency in Institutional
Theory, in INSTITUTIONAL PATIERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURE AND ENVIRONIENT

3, 15 (Lynne G. Zucker ed., 1988); Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional
Effects, and Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 143, 153-57 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
60. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 58, at 10-11.
61. In contrast with the "old institutionalism," which focused on concrete normative, political, and cultural influences in local environments, e.g., PHInP SELZNICK,
TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS (1949), "new institutionalism" postulates that larger scale
environmental forces affect entire industries, professions, and societies. See John W.
Meyer & Brian Rowan, InsitutionalizedOrganizations:FormalStructure as Myth and
Ceremony, 83 Ass. J. Soc. 340 (1977); DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 58; DiMaggio &
Powell, supra note 59.
62. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 59, at 152-54.
63. See, e.g., id. at 152-53; Suchman, supra note 54; Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
ProfessionalConstructionof Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge,26 L. &
Soc'y REV. 47, 61 (1992).
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job placement and socialization. Second, institutionalized criteria
(such as friendship, status, or professional norms) affect organizational behavior instead of, or in addition to, criteria relating to organizational outcomes and efficiency. 64 In the disputing context, this
might come into play where influential professional and organizational leaders endorse (and thus legitimize) use of mediation or other
ADR procedures. Institutional theory would thus focus on use of mediation because it is seen as legitimate and appropriate in the local
culture, rather than because of calculations of technical advantages
of using mediation in particular cases.
Specifically regarding diffusion of innovations, institutional theory suggests that both efficacy and legitimacy of innovations are important, though in differing proportions at different stages of
diffusion. Tolbert and Zucker argue that in the early stages of institutionalization, those adopting innovations are often motivated to
improve performance, and that after a certain point in the institutionalization process, adoption of innovations is based more on the
innovations' value in providing legitimacy than on improving performance. 65 For example, their study of civil service reforms in U.S.
cities showed that at the beginning of the institutionalization of these
reforms, adoption of reforms could be predicted by factors such as the
existence of local corruption, efforts to control influence of immigrants, and pressure from middle classes to implement scientific
management procedures. After the notion of civil service reforms had
been legitimated, these factors no longer explained why cities
adopted the reforms or did not do so. In essence, cities eventually
adopted civil service reforms because the reforms were perceived to
be the right way to organize local government, rather than because
the reforms were designed to solve problems actually existing in
those cities.
Professionals often play key roles in diffusion of innovations, as
they typically are well-suited both to identify problems in existing
technologies and to recognize threats to organizational legitimacy.
Professionals can perform these activities because of their specialized
knowledge and their placement in key organizational roles. Thus, institutional theory contends that professional networks are important
media of diffusion and that the extent to which professionals adopt an
64. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 59, at 147-53.
65. See Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Sources of Change in
the Formal Structure of Organizations:The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 18801935, 28 Anum. Smi. Q. 22, 35-36 (1983).
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innovation promoted by their profession is related to the strength of
66
ties to their profession.
Similarly, institutional theory argues that the strength of ties to
intra-organizational networks would predict the extent to which organizational members would adopt an innovation being diffused
through intra-organizational channels. This seems especially likely
regarding ideas promoted by organizational leaders. 6 7 While it may
seem "only rational" for organizational members to agree with powerful authorities, such agreement reflects an institutionalization process in which following rules or accepting the "company line"
substitutes for individualized calculation and judgment. 68 Thus, institutional theory argues that acceptance of innovations such as regularly using mediation is related to strength of ties to organizations
and their leaders who support the innovations, as well as the perceived power, success, and professional prestige of the organizations
69
and leaders.
As this summary suggests, theories of institutionalism and professions overlap. Many different theories of professions suggest that
the production and use of abstract specialized knowledge play a critical role in the development of professions and the work of professionals. 70 In functionalist theories, the production of professional
knowledge and the education of professionals are important tasks for
professionals to perform properly in their social functions, such as
providing order and justice (by the legal profession) and health (by
the medical profession). 7 1
66. See DiMaggio and Powell, supra note 59, at 152-54.
67. See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Management as Symbolic Action: The Creation and Maintenance of OrganizationalParadigms,3 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 19-22 (1981).

68. See Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalizationin CulturalPersistence,
42 AM. Soc. REV. 726, 731-42 (1977). This is a classic experiment in which subjects
were asked to estimate the distance that a light moved. Subjects gave their estimates
after a confederate gave an estimate of the same distance. Subjects' estimates were
closer to the confederates' estimates when confederates were identified as the most
senior member of the organization than when identified simply as a member of the
organization or not identified at all.
69. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 59, at 155.
70. See generally Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New
Problems and New Paradigmsin Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAwYFES' IDEALs /
LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Introduction]; Robert L. Nelson & David
M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism:The ProfessionalIdeologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS / LAwYERs' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION 177 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
71. See TALcorr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951).
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A "market control" school agrees that knowledge is key to the
development of professions, but these theorists argue that it plays a
different role than the functionalists argue it plays.7 2 Under this perspective, professionalism is the "collective mobility project" of various
occupational groups to be achieved through control over their markets. These theorists argue that professional groups try to establish
a consensus about a cognitive basis for their work to justify monopoly
control over markets for their expertise. In addition to providing justifications for control over a sphere of public life, these cognitive
73
claims also provide professionals with a sense of identity.
A third school of thought highlights the role of abstract knowledge as the principal element in definitions of professionalism. Abbott argues that the development of professions is much more
contingent than suggested by functionalist and market control theories. He asserts that jurisdictions of particular professions shift over
time in relation to the jurisdictions of "neighboring" professions. Abstract knowledge is a critical element of a profession, in this view,
because the abstract nature of a profession's knowledge base provides
a professional group with the flexibility to claim desired work tasks
for its jurisdiction and exclude undesirable tasks from it. 7 4 Thus,
these three approaches all emphasize the importance of knowledge in
generating and maintaining professions, albeit for different reasons.
In the disputing context, one might expect development of knowledge
about mediation to be generated by and spread through professionals
like lawyers.
Various theories of professionalization highlight professional autonomy as a primary motivating force for the work of professionals
and development of professional knowledge. Different theories use
the concept of autonomy, referring to struggles with various sets of
competitors and countervailing forces. For example, Solomon identifies several influences from which lawyers and their professional associations seek independence and control, including clients,
government regulation, market ethics, and encroachment of other occupations on lawyers' work jurisdiction.7 5 In structural/functional
72. See MAGAU SARFATI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SocIoLoGI.
cAL ANALYSIS (1977); see also RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
73.

See LARSON, supra note 72, at 49-50.

74. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PhOFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE ExTrr

DVisION OF LABOR 8-9 (1988).
75. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAwYERs' IDEALS I LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORmATIONS IN
THE AmmCAN LEGAL PROFESSION 144 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); see also
Harriet Gross & Grace Budrys, Control Over Work in a PrepaidGroup Practice, in 6
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theories, professionals must be autonomous from their clients so that
they can properly perform their social functions. 78 In market-control
theories, professionals-who typically work in large organizationsseek autonomy from bureaucratic control in capitalist organizations
as they compete for status within class hierarchies.7 7 In addition,
various theorists have argued that the production and control of
knowledge and techniques is a principal source of professionals' social power in relation to competing professions and in society more
generally. 78 Whereas some theorists focus on professionals' efforts
seeking control over others, Van Maanen and Barley focus on efforts
to protect against control by others in a persistent quest for occupational self-control.7 9 In all these theories, new knowledge and techniques-such as mediation-as means for handling disputes are
potent weapons in struggles for control over professional work.
Some scholars challenge the notion that professionals are primarily motivated to maintain and increase their autonomy.8 0 In contrast to theories emphasizing professional autonomy as a primary
motivating force behind the growth of professions, other theories
highlight the goal of maximizing social status. Such theories focus on
aspirations of enhanced social respect enjoyed by virtue of holding
more prestigious occupational roles. Thus, professional groups may,
for example, seek to raise standards of practice as a means of legitimating and improving their collective status.8 ' By the same token,
efforts to adopt new professional ideas and practices, such as mediation, may be motivated by a desire to increase individual or collective
professional status.
In contrast, economic theories generally focus on motivations to
achieve goals and maximize self-interest. Such rational theories typically assume that individuals act based on careful calculations of optimality of alternative possible outcomes rather than judgments of
CURRENT RES. ON OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 279, 280-82 (H. Z. Lopata and J. A.
Levy, eds. 1991).

76. See PARSONS supra note 71, at 434-45; Nelson & Trubek, Introduction,supra
note 70, at 15-16.
77. See LARSON, supra note 72, at 190-93.
78. See, e.g., ABBOTr, supra note 74, at 8; LARSON, supra note 72, at 180-81;
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 59, at 152-53.
79. John Van Maanen & Stephen R. Barley, OccupationalCommunities: Culture
and Control in Organizations,6 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 287, 333-39 (1984).
80. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SocIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW Fiim 231-34 (1988).
81. See LARSON , supra note 72, at 216; ABEL, supra note 72, at 18-30.

HeinOnline -- 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 158 2000

Spring 2000]

Getting the Faith

appropriateness of behavior.8 2 Economic theories of professionalization explain that development of specialized skills and development
of knowledge are, effectively, human capital investments used as a
means of increasing professionals' economic returns.8 3 Increased
professional training (or other means of obtaining professional
knowledge, such as subscription to professional publications) is
needed to obtain specialized knowledge necessary for competition in
the market for professional services. The costs of acquiring such information can be used to justify increased prices of services on the
basis of increased efficiency or quality.84 Under an economic perspective, adoption of professional innovations may be the result of efforts
to increase efficiency and provide more desirable services for consumers with the ultimate goal of advancing professionals' own economic
interests.8 5 Economic theory would predict that professionals would
develop and adopt mediation practices to the extent that the professionals would expect to profit from those practices.
Increasing work satisfaction is another potential motivating
force for the development of new professional practices. Thus, for example, the opportunity to focus on practicing medicine, concentrating
on what is best for patients without the business pressures of private
practice, led some doctors into practice in health maintenance organizations. For such doctors, a "service ideology," focusing on practicing
"good medicine," may be the most important aspect of their professional work.8 6 By the same token, McEwen et al. found that attorneys in Maine supported use of divorce mediation because it helped
82. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 61, at 340-45; March, supra note 59, at 22123.
83. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, SharingAmong the Human

Capitalists:An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners
Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985); MARc GALANTER & THO=AS PALAY, TOURNA.
MlENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAw
84. See ABEL, supra note 72, at 25.

Fmbi 90-108 (1991).

85. Market-control theories suggest a different mechanism leading to similar results. Under these theories, developing professional knowledge would legitimize control over certain occupational markets that would increase professionals' economic
positions, among other things. See LARsON, supra note 72, at 216-19.
86. See Gross & Budrys, supra note 75, at 285. Though working for an HMO
presumably entails a tradeoff of business and administrative activities as compared
with private practice, rather than a total relief from such distractions from the work
ofpracticing medicine, physicians may well experience some net relief from such pressures. Gross and Budrys' study was based on interviews conducted in 1987. As a
result of changing conditions in the health care industry, doctors may now be less
likely to view IMOs as providing opportunities to perform satisfying work. Despite
(or perhaps because of) such changes, doctors may still be motivated by opportunities
to do work they find satisfying, though perhaps in other organizational forms. See
Steven Greenhouse, AM.A's Delegates Vote to Unionize, N. Y. Tmes, June 24, 1999,
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them solve problems inherent in divorce practice.8 7 This is similar to
Skolnick's description of police officers' perspectives as craftsmen interpreting organizational and legal developments through the lens of
pride in their abilities to perform their craft of law enforcement.8 8
Although this explanation is somewhat similar to functionalist theory, it does not focus so much on achievement of societal functions as
on satisfaction of individuals' desires to perform their professional
tasks well and serve clients optimally.
As the preceding discussion indicates, various sociological theories consider the creation and dissemination of new knowledge, ideas,
and techniques central to the development of professions and organizational life for complementary reasons. Institutional theory focuses
on the taken-for-granted nature of conceptions and highlights the
role of professionals in creating and disseminating such concepts. By
creating and using abstract conceptions in their day-to-day work, professionals legitimate these conceptions by making them increasingly
taken-for-granted. Various theories of the professions focus on the
importance of developing a body of specialized and abstract knowledge on which professions generally-and professionals individually-can serve social functions, gain market control, secure
autonomy in performing professional functions, increase satisfaction
in doing their work, serve their own economic interests and their organizations' economic interests, maximize social status, and derive
legitimacy.
This study examines whether recent increased belief in mediation is related to linkages to legitimating organizations and professional networks, as suggested by institutional theory. In particular,
it analyzes the perspectives of lawyers, who are the quintessential
repeat-players8 9 in dealing with legal disputes, and compares them
with the perspectives of business executives, who are typically lessfrequent players. Lawyers (at least litigators) are professional dispute-handlers who develop cognitive models of disputing and incorporate these models into their everyday practices. 90 It is precisely this
kind of knowledge that the professions literature suggests is critically
at Al (quoting American Medical Association president who argues that unionization
of doctors would focus on improving patient care).
87. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of Divorce Practice,
28 L. & Soc'y REv. 149, 156-63 (1994).
88. SKOLNICK, supra note 51, at 196-99, 233-35.
89. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974).
90. Cf Suchman, supra note 54, at 292-300. ("Law firms enjoy regular contact
with a large number of companies facing similar sets of operational challenges, and
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important in achieving a variety of professional goals. Institutional
theory particularly focuses on a need to maintain legitimacy and thus
could help explain belief in mediation. During the same period that
the legal profession has been encountering a continued attack on its
public legitimacy, 9 1 the level of ADR activity has been growing
amidst suggestions that it may help address public relations
problems of the legal profession.9 2 Thus, perception of ADR (generally) and mediation (in particular) as a specialized body of knowledge
addressing problems faced by professionals and their clients would be
expected to affect the legitimacy of the legal profession. Various theories of the professions also provide potential explanations for increased belief in mediation. These theories suggest that
professionals might accept this ideology based on expectations of increased professional autonomy, social status, material advancement,
and work satisfaction. Based on interviews with business lawyers
and executives in this study, Part VIII.A, infra, presents an analysis
of how well these theories may help explain increased belief in
mediation.
III.

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on two complementary data analyses: (1)
qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews, and (2) quantitative analysis of survey interviews. The qualitative interviews capture a richer
expression of the respondents' opinions, including some of their own
analyses of how their views are interrelated. However, because of the
nonrandom sampling and the small number of qualitative interviews,
it is difficult to generalize from that data to the general population of
business lawyers and executives. The survey interviews have complementary advantages and disadvantages. These interviews permit
sharply focused and standardized probes yielding data that can be
analyzed statistically, and, because the survey respondents were selected using a randomized procedure, the survey results provide reasonable reflections of the survey populations within calculable

this vicarious exposure allows attorneys to monitor wide ranges of client strategies,
and to formulate coherent accounts of the determinants of success and failure.")
91. See generally Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites:Lauwer-Bashing and
Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. Rxv. 633 (1994).
92. See Randall T. Shepard, Lauwer.Bashing and The Challenge of a Sensible
Response, 27 IND. L. Rxv. 699, 707 (1994).
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margins of error. Combining both methods in this study permits "triangulation,"9 3 providing a more comprehensive explanation of disputing ideologies than would be possible from either method
individually.
I conducted 13 face-to-face qualitative interviews in southern
Wisconsin in the first half of 1994. Respondents were selected using
a "snowball" sampling procedure, i.e., respondents and other knowledgeable people were asked to suggest names of other possible respondents. There were roughly equal numbers of each of three types
of respondents: four inside counsel, four outside counsel, and five
non-lawyer executives. I developed interview protocols to serve as a
general guide for the interviews. Based on the flow of the interviews,
I asked unscripted follow-up questions and skipped questions in the
protocol. Interviews generally lasted 90 to 150 minutes. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed for analysis. Excerpts of
these interviews were selected for this article to illustrate some pat4
terns reflected in the quantitative dataY
For the quantitative analysis, I conducted standardized telephone interviews of respondents in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Florida. I selected respondents from a few states,
rather than on a nationwide basis, to highlight differences between
respondents, since legal and ADR cultures-which are likely to affect
(at least attorney) opinions-might vary dramatically by state. 95
93. See

MARTYN HAMMERSLEY

&

PAUL ATKINSON, ETHNOGRAPHY: PRINCIPLES IN

198-200 (1983) (noting that collecting data using different sources and
methods increases confidence in validity of findings).
94. In some instances, grammatical errors common in spoken language have
been left as spoken when this did not interfere with the understanding of the quoted
statements. Some quotations have been edited to enhance readability. Where speakers repeated words or used similar patterns of everyday conversation that did not
PRACTICE

affect the meaning, the repeated words were omitted without ellipsis or brackets. All
editing has maintained the substance and tone of respondents' statements. Full,
unedited transcripts are on file with the author. Because the subjects were promised
that the interviews would be confidential, the subjects are identified only by number
and an indication of whether they were an outside counsel, inside counsel, or executive. The interviews were numbered in the order that they were transcribed rather
than the order in which they were conducted.
95. The sampling procedure centered around what I initially called "ADR culture," but later called "mediation culture," based on responses to the survey. See John
Lande, FailingFaith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives'
Opinions, 3 HARv. NEG. L. REv. 1, 69-70 (1998) [hereinafter Lande, FailingFaith].
The literature on local legal culture attempts to explain variations in patterns of practice based on informal norms and expectations of regular players in a local legal system about how things are done there. See Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn
Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of Litigation, 27 L. & Soc'Y REV. 535,
538-41 (1993). Casual observations of differences in legal structures, behavior, and
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The sampling frame 96 of non-lawyer executives was drawn from
the Compact Disclosure database on companies filing information
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. I constructed
sampling frames to include all named officers in companies with more
than 50 employees. The sampling frames for inside and outside counsel were drawn from the Westlaw online database, which contained
listings of approximately 600,000 lawyers in the U.S. Potential inside counsel respondents were excluded if they worked for firms with
fewer than 50 employees or if they did not spend at least five percent
of their time working on litigation. Because insurance companies are
uniquely in the business of litigation, inside counsel employed by insurance companies were also excluded. To select outside counsel, I
used the commercial law directory in Westlaw and selected attorneys
whose listings indicated that their practices include litigation. I excluded outside counsel from the sample if they worked in firms employing 10 or fewer attorneys or if they did not spend at least five
percent of their time working on litigation.
Using these databases, I developed 12 sampling frames for selection of respondents: one for each of the three types of respondent in
each of the four states. Then, potential respondents were selected
randomly from each sampling frame. Survey interviews were completed for 178 respondents, including 70 outside counsel, 58 inside
counsel, and 50 executives. The overall response rate was 66%. The
attorneys were especially cooperative, as more than 80,%agreed to
participate. Executives were less cooperative; only 43% agreed to
participate. 9 7 The interviews were completed in the second half of
attitudes about ADR in different states and localities raises the possibility of analogous "mediation culture" (or "ADR culture") phenomena. For example, the mediation
culture in one state may be quite congenial to a large volume of mediation practice
whereas the mediation culture in another state might be quite inhospitable for mediation practice. In fact, respondents in Florida and Massachusetts, two states identified
as having strong ADR cultures, had greater belief in mediation than respondents in
Tennessee and Pennsylvania, two states identified as having weak ADR cultures. See
App.1, infra. The differences generally were observed after controlling for a variety of
other variables. See John Lande, The Diffusion of a Process Pluralist Ideology of Disputing- Factors Affecting Opinions of Business Lawyers and Executives 182-183
(1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin (Madison) (on file
with author)) [hereinafter Lande, Ideology of Disputing].
For further information about the procedures for selecting states for this survey,
see Lande, FailingFaith, supra at 69-70.
96. A sampling frame is a list of potential respondents who may be asked to participate in the survey. In this survey, I randomly selected potential respondents to be
interviewed from the sampling frames described in the text.
97. High response rates reduce the risk of selection bias (i.e., where the opinions
of respondents were systematically different in significant ways from those who refused to respond to the complete interview). In this survey, the response rates for the
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1994.98 They were conducted by telephone and generally lasted 20 to
25 minutes. Slightly different versions of the surveys were developed
to fit the different types of respondents, though the substance was the
same for all respondents.
Many of the survey questions used 11-point "Likert scales," with
possible answers ranging from zero to ten and a middle category of
five. 99 To simplify the presentation in this article, the data are generally collapsed into three categories: zero to four, five, and six to ten,
reflecting responses below, at, and above the middle category. Collapsing the data makes it easier to present and understand; however,
it sacrifices some important information about the intensity of responses. The statistical significance tests'0 0 were based on the full,
uncollapsed scales.
attorneys are quite high by social science standards, suggesting a low risk of selection
bias. Although the response rate for the executives is obviously lower than for the
attorneys, it is not unusually low and some statistical tests suggest that it did not
indicate significant selection bias. In addition to the 178 complete interviews, I conducted very brief interviews with 18 respondents who were not willing to give the
time for a complete interview. These interviews were used to help test for selection
bias. For more information about testing for selection bias, see Lande, FailingFaith,
supra note 95, at 10 n.33. In addition, as available, responses in the brief interviews
were used in the main analyses of this study.
98. Obviously the data reflect respondents' perspectives when they were interviewed and their views may change over time. Unlike litigation, which is already
deeply institutionalized in U.S. society, mediation and ADR have been in the process
of institutionalization in recent decades. Thus, it is quite possible that opinions about
mediation have changed since the data were collected for this article. It would be
useful to conduct similar studies in the future to track changes in the opinions described in this article.
99. For example, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with
various statements on a scale from zero to ten, where zero meant that they strongly
disagreed, ten meant that they strongly agreed, and five was right in the middle. The
same type of scale was used with questions in other response categories such as
whether they thought that their professional leaders have favorable or unfavorable
opinions about ADR, whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with their experiences in ADR, etc. A number of questions asked respondents to give their opinions in
the form of frequencies, such as how often executives are satisfied with the results of
mediation. Respondents were told that zero meant "never," ten meant "always," and
five meant "about half the time."
100. A finding is considered statistically significant if the probability of error due
to chance is less than a specified amount. This study focuses on relationships between pairs of variables (i.e., correlations), thus the rest of this footnote refers to
whether they are statistically significant. In the social sciences, the minimum
probability acceptable for statistical significance is conventionally considered to be
five percent and this is indicated as "p < .05." In other words, the observed relationship is considered statistically significant if there is less than a five percent chance
that one would observe the relationship in the sample data if such a relationship did
not exist in the full population. It may be easier to think of it this way: there is at
least a 95% probability that there really is a relationship in the full population given
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The survey interviews included a series of questions regarding
respondents' opinions about litigation' 01 and a similar series of questions regarding their opinions about mediation, arbitration, and ADR
generally. 10 2 Indeed, some of the questions about ADR used the
same wording as the questions about litigation, except for a reference
to ADR (or mediation) instead of litigation (or the courts). For example, one question asked for a rating of agreement or disagreement
with the statement "The legal system generally considers the needs
and practices of particular business communities." In the series of
questions about ADR, respondents were asked for a similar rating
about the statement "Mediators and arbitrators generally consider
the needs and practices of particular business communities." For
these questions it is possible to create relative ratings by subtracting
the ratings about litigation from the ratings about ADR. If a respondent gave the same rating to both questions, the relative rating
would be zero. If the rating about ADR was higher than the rating
for litigation, the relative rating would be a positive number. If the
rating about ADR was lower than the rating for litigation, the relative rating would be a negative number.

the statistical relationship in the data collected from the sample. One has even
greater confidence in a finding if the relationship is significant at the .01 or .001
levels. Note that one should not interpret a statistically significant finding as indicating that the relationship necessarily exists in the population; rather, this simply
means that the collected data support that hypothesis. The converse is also true: a
finding that is not statistically significant does not necessarily mean that there is no
such relationship in the population. If an observation (such as a correlation presented
in this article) is not statistically significant, one should generally not make any inference based on the observation, such as the sign or magnitude of the correlation. Note
that statistical significance is affected by the sample size so that, for example, a .20
correlation may be statistically significant in a large sample but not in a small sample. See generally JoHN NErER r AL., APPLIED STATwiTCS 310-38 (3d ed. 1988).
101. For presentation of the survey results regarding respondents' opinions about
litigation, see Lande, FailingFaith, supra note 95.
102. Because this study dealt with ADR more generally, survey questions were
designed to include a combination of questions about ADR generally and mediation
specifically, depending on how much respondents were expected to distinguish the
procedures in answering the question. See supra note 12. This article necessarily
reports about the dispute resolution procedure(s) actually referred to in the questions,
not simply mediation.
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103

Respondents' ProfessionalExperience and Organizational
Settings

In general, the survey respondents are middle-aged men. The
vast majority (85%) of the sample is male. They ranged in age from
27 to 77 with an average of 44. The average age was 42 for outside
counsel, 40 for inside counsel, and 50 for executives. 10 4 Respondents
work for firms in a wide variety of industries or, in the case of outside
counsel, serve clients in many different industries. The industries
most represented in the sample are general manufacturing, finance,
health care, and computers. Outside counsel had been employed by
their current firms for an average of eight years, compared with ten
years for inside counsel and thirteen years for executives.
Inside counsel in the sample generally work for larger and more
complex firms than the executives. Inside counsel gave a median'0°
estimate of 4000 to 5000 employees, including 6 to 10 attorneys, in
their firms. By contrast, the executives gave a median estimate of
750 to 1000 employees, including one attorney, in their firms. Close
to half (43%) of the inside counsel's firms are wholly-owned subsidiaries whereas very few (6%) of the executives' firms are wholly-owned
subsidiaries.
Most outside counsel (59%) in the sample work in firms with offices in one or two cities. The median size of their law firm is in the
range of 51 to 100 attorneys. The vast majority of outside counsel's
clients (an average estimate of 82%) are businesses, and most of
these business clients (an average estimate of 73%) have annual revenues of more than $1 million.
Most respondents own an interest in their firms, including 66%
of the inside counsel and 90% of the executives who own stock in their
firms. Slightly more than half of the outside counsel (53%) are equity
103. This Part provides a summary of the survey respondents' background and
experience. For further detail, see Lande, Ideology of Disputing,supra note 95, at 6588.
104. The age difference (as well as the length of tenure in their positions described
in the text) is probably a function of differences in sampling frames. The frames for
the attorneys included both junior and senior attorneys whereas the frame for executives included only the top several levels of executives in the corporations. For further information on the sampling frames, see supra Part III.
105. The median refers to the 501 percentile in a group, i.e., half the values are
above the median and half are below it. The median is sometimes considered a better
measure of central tendency than an average when some scores have extreme values

and thus skew the average disproportionately.
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partners in their law firms. The different types of respondents fit into
very different organizational authority structures. To determine who
are their "organizational superiors," respondents were asked about
the positions of the people whose judgments and decisions affected
them most in their current positions. For outside counsel in this
sample, the organizational superiors are divided almost equally between partners in their law firms and their clients, with somewhat
more in the former category. The organizational superiors for approximately two-thirds of inside counsel in the sample are non-legal
executives, officers, and managers in their firms. For most of the
other inside counsel, their organizational superiors were the top officials in their legal departments. The organizational superiors for
three-quarters of the executives are other top executives and officers
in their firms. Most of the other executives said that they were affected most by the judgments and decisions of their firms' customers
or clients.
B.

Respondents' Experience with Litigation and ADR

Inside counsel and outside counsel in the sample had practiced
law for an average of 14 years; however, outside counsel had devoted
a greater proportion of their time to litigation activities than had inside counsel. Outside counsel estimated that litigation took an average of 83% of their time in the prior year, compared with 57% for
inside counsel. Indeed, so many outside counsel devote virtually all
of their time to litigation that the median response was 98% of their
time. Outside counsel also devoted a greater proportion of their entire legal careers to litigation than inside counsel. Outside counsel
said that they spent at least half of their time doing litigation in an
average of 82% of the years since they received their law degrees; this
compares with an average of 62% for inside counsel. Not surprisingly, the proportion of lawyers' current time devoted to litigation is
strongly correlated with the proportion of their careers in which they
106
have focused on litigation.
As these data indicate, for many lawyers, litigation is the central
focus of their work. This is rarely the case for executives. As one
106. Correlation refers to the extent of linear association between two variables.
Where two variables are perfectly associated, if one knows the value of one variable,
one can tell the exact value of the other; in that situation, the correlation coefficient is
1.0. For example, the length of objects in inches is perfectly correlated with the length
in feet. Correlations have a negative value if the increase in one variable is associated
with the decrease of another variable. For example, if B is a point on a straight line
with endpoints A and C, the distance between A and B is negatively correlated with
the distance between B and C, i.e., -1.0. Larger correlation coefficients in absolute
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might expect, executives in the study had less experience with litigation than the attorneys in the study. In fact, one needs to measure
amount of experience quite differently for lawyers and non-lawyers.
Overall, the executives in this study had little experience personally
as a party, witness, or juror, but had somewhat more experience participating in decision-making about litigation for businesses. Thirtytwo percent of the executives had never been a juror or witness and
40% had been a juror or witness only once or twice. Almost three10 7
quarters (74%) said that they have never been a party in a lawsuit
and an additional 22% said that they had been a party only once.
However, more than three-quarters (82%) said that they had been
responsible, individually or as part of a team, for decision-making for
a business in a lawsuit, with the median of four or five suits in which
they had played such a role. Thus, most of the executives' personal
experience with litigation had been in their professional capacity at
work.
All three groups of respondents experienced litigation in their
professional roles much more frequently from the perspective of defendants 0 8 rather than plaintiffs. This was especially true for inside
counsel, whose average estimate was that their firm was a defendant
in 82% of cases that they personally handled or supervised in the
prior three years, compared with 65% for outside counsel, and 73%
for executives.
Experience participating in ADRo 9 varied by type of respondent.
Outside counsel have the most experience as third-party neutrals
value (i.e, numerical value without regard to whether it is positive or negative) indicate greater degrees of association between the two variables. If there is no association, the correlation is 0. See NETER ET AL., supra note 100, at 172-73. Correlations
indicated in the text are statistically significant unless otherwise indicated. For further information about statistical significance, see NEWER ET AL., supra note 100.
107. This excluded situations where they may have been named as parties but
were not personally involved in the events giving rise to the suit.
108. As several attorneys pointed out, the distinction between plaintiff and defendant status may be misleading in some cases where the parties have claims
against each other and the formal status reflects who "got to the courthouse" or "pulled the trigger" first. Thus, the measure of how often the respondents' firms or clients
are defendants is necessarily imprecise. Nonetheless, the concept was quite meaningful for respondents, and most had no problem providing estimates in response to this
question.
109. Survey respondents were asked if they were familiar with the term "ADR."
Those who said that they were not familiar with the term or who seemed to be unsure
were read the following statement: 'ADR' refers to procedures for resolving disputes
using some third party other than a judge, such as an arbitrator, who makes a binding decision, or a mediator, who cannot make a binding decision but rather helps
parties trying to reach an agreement." All respondents were read the following language, further defining the term for the purpose of the survey: "I am not including
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(such as arbitrators or mediators), 110 while executives have the least.
About half of outside counsel (47%), one quarter of inside counsel
(26%), and 7% of the executives have served as a neutrals at least
once." -' Respondents generally have more experience with ADR as
partisans (i.e., advocates and principals) than as neutrals. The attorneys have much more experience as partisans in ADR than did the
executives. Ninety percent of the outside counsel and 84% of the inside counsel have some experience as a partisan in ADR compared
with only 39% of the executives."12 More than half of the attorneys
have participated as partisans in at least four ADR proceedings, compared with only 12 percent of executives.
C. Respondents' Sources of Information About ADR
Before considering the respondents' opinions about ADR, it is
helpful to consider where they received their information about it.
Respondents were given a list of potential sources of information and
asked whether they had "gotten no information, a little information,
or more than a little information about ADR from that source." After
going through each information source on the list, they were asked to
identify the source from which they received the most information.
As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, personal experience with ADR is a major
source of information for about two-thirds of the attorneys and oneunion grievance procedures, procedures in government agencies like the EEOC, or
negotiation without a third party." This definition suggests that the terms mediation,
arbitration, and ADR refer to somewhat formal procedures rather than informal interactions that are quite common in everyday life (e.g., mediating between co-workers
or relatives). Respondents' answers to questions about frequency of ADR experience
suggest that they generally understood the terms to be used in the more limited
sense.
110. For simplicity, I refer to this as experience as being a "neutral." I use this
term reflecting common usage, even though mediators and arbitrators may not necessarily be neutral in fact in some situations. See Lande, supra note 1, at 881-82 (noting
that mediators may be biased consciously or unconsciously in favor of actual or prospective repeat customers).
111. This level of service as a neutral is somewhat lower than reported in a survey
of Minnesota attorneys, where 70% reported having served as a neutral. Appro:dmately 86% of the attorneys in the Minnesota sample are in private practice. These
results are based on questionnaires from 748 attorneys reflecting a response rate of
74.8%. See BOBBI McADoo, A REPORT TO THE M NESoTA SuPREuE Couirr THE ImPACT OF RuLE 114 ON CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE IN M NESOTA 10, app. C-3, C-5
(1997). Only 17% of Western Australian attorneys reported serving as an ADR neutral during the prior year. See Zariski, supra note 5, at app. A.
112. This is comparable to the experience of Minnesota attorneys, 800 of whom
reported using ADR in at least one civil case within the preceding two years. See
McADoo, supra note 111, at app. C-7. Almost half (42%) of Western Australian attorneys reported having represented a client in mediation during the preceding year.
See Zariski, supra note 5.
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third of the executives. This represents the largest single source of
information, except that a slightly larger percentage of the executives
said that they received more than a little information from attorneys.
Indeed, it appears that attorneys generally are a major source of information about ADR. Almost half of the outside counsel said that
they received more than a little information from colleagues in their
firm and almost half of the inside counsel said that they received
more than a little from attorneys who are not in their firm." 3
The executives generally do not get much information about ADR
beyond what they obtain from attorneys and personal experience.
About half of the attorneys, by contrast, obtain information from
most of the other sources listed, including providers of ADR services,
continuing education programs, and professional publications. Only
a small minority-ten percent or less-of all three types of respondents received more than a little information about ADR from their
professional schooling. Given that 11 or 12 years is the median period since lawyers had received their degrees, many of the lawyers
graduated from law school in the mid-1980s, when there was much
less ADR in the curriculum than at present. The executives had received their degrees a median 22 years earlier; thus, many had been
in school in the mid-1970s when there were even fewer ADR course
offerings.
Table 1. Sources of "More than a Little" Information about ADR

(percent who received "more than a little information" from each source)
Outside Counsel

Inside Counsel

Executives

Personal experience with ADR

69

62

32

Colleagues in their firm

46

21

14

Colleagues not in their firm

24

47

10

Lawyers (executives only)

-

-

36

ADR providers

51

38

6

Professional school

10

5

2

Continuing education

43

47

16

Professional publications

50

43

10

113. The wording of the questions varied for the attorneys and executives. The
attorneys were asked about lawyers in their firms (or lawyers who were not in their
firms). The executives were asked about colleagues in their firms other than lawyers
(or such colleagues not in their firms).
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Table 2. Sources of Most Information about ADR
Outside Counsel

Inside Counsel

Exccutives

Personal experience with ADR

42

40

33

Colleagues in their firm

13

7

7

Colleagues not in their firm

3

3

0

Lawyers (executives only)

-

-

37

ADR providers

15

10

0

Professional school

3

2

0

Continuing education

10

19

14

Professional publications

15

19

9

101.

100

100

69

58

43

Total
Number of respondents

* does not add to 100 percent due to rounding

V. RESPONDENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT MEDIATION AND ADR

In contrast to respondents' opinions about the court system,
where there are regular and dramatic differences between respondents, the three types of respondents have remarkably similar and
generally favorable opinions about mediation. Virtually all of the attorneys and many of the executives said that they were familiar with
ADR. To be sure that the respondents had at least a basic understanding of ADR, they were given basic definitions of ADR as well as
arbitration and mediation, the two principal ADR procedures. The
fact that there are differences in knowledge about the processes is not
a serious problem for this project, as it is not testing respondents'
knowledge but rather is focusing on their opinions about how often
these disputing processes are appropriate. In addition, respondents
were asked about their level of knowledge and experience with ADR,
permitting comparisons of opinions based on their levels of knowl114
edge and experience.
A. Belief in Mediation
A key element of contemporary disputing ideology deals with
how often mediation or other ADR procedures are appropriate. This
is the essence of the question when, for example, a businessperson
asks a lawyer, "Are you a believer in ADR?" 115 Though the question
114. See Tables 5 and 6, infra.
115. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994). I recently attended a conference presentation on mediation of workers' compensation cases in which a panelist
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implies that it can be answered with a simple "yes" or "no," many
people qualify their answers based on various circumstances. Lawyers often prefer to talk in terms of case-by-case analyses. Even
when people generalize, they typically refer to different categories of
cases, amounts at stake, relationships between the players, stages in
the disputes, or any number of other factors. Thus, it is probably impossible precisely to define and measure disputing ideologies in terms
of belief in particular disputing procedures. Nevertheless, people are
asked quite generally whether they are "believers in mediation," and
many can interpret the question and answer it with little difficulty.
To permit people to reflect various contingencies into their responses, survey respondents in this study were asked how often they
believe that it is appropriate to use mediation in lawsuits involving a
business.1 1 6 For simplicity, responses to these questions are referred
to as "belief in" mediation. This question also permitted respondents
to reflect the intensity of their beliefs. It is not unusual in everyday
conversation for people to say that mediation should be used in, say,
virtually all cases, or only rarely, or in some but not all categories of
cases. These responses provide some indication of what they believe
about mediation. While numerical frequency measures inevitably
simplify respondents' possibly complex beliefs, if well constructed,
they may be reasonably good indicators of people's disputing
ideologies.117
Respondents in this study believe that mediation is often appropriate to use in lawsuits involving a business, with the outside counsel expressing significantly more support than the executives.
Majorities of both outside and inside counsel believe that mediation
is appropriate in more than half the cases and another fifth believe
said, "I am a believer in mediation." Eddie H. Walker, Jr., Panel Discussion on Mediation at the 13th Annual Workers' Compensation Educational Conference of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Aug. 26, 1999).
116. Following an introduction referring to disputes involving a business, respondents were asked "how often mediation is appropriate, where zero means never, ten
means always, and five means about half the time."
117. See generally, HowARD ScnmlAN & STANLEY PRESSER, QUESTIONS ANDANswERs N ATITUDE SuRvEYs (1981). The survey questionnaire did not distinguish

very much between characteristics of disputes. Most questions referred simply to disputes involving a business, though some questions specified that the dispute was
brought by an individual against a business or was between two businesses. The preliminary interviews sought to identify "native" categorizations of disputes, but this
was omitted from the survey because no simple, shared scheme was readily apparent.
As a result, the survey data have some offsetting advantages and disadvantages. The
principal disadvantage is that the questions are not placed in more real-life contexts.
On the other hand, the survey questions may tap more generic ideologies, free of potentially confusing qualifications.
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that it is appropriate in half these cases (see Table 3). No more than
about a quarter of these attorneys believe that mediation is appropriate in less than half the cases. The executives also generally believe
that mediation is often appropriate, with about half the executives
saying that it is appropriate in about half of the cases and only 16%
saying that it is appropriate in less than half the cases. 118 Thus,
while all groups believe that mediation should be used often in business disputes-i.e., "believe in" mediation-as a whole, outside counsel believe in mediation significantly more than the executives do." 9
The aggregate responses of the inside counsel are in between the inside counsel and executives and are not significantly different from
the other two types of respondents.
A substantial minority of respondents' belief in mediation can be
considered a matter of faith. This seems like an appropriate interpretation for respondents who answered this question with a response of "10," indicating that they believe that mediation is always
118. The uncertainty of some executives is reflected in the following excerpt at the
end of a long response to a question about whether courts should refer more cases to
ADR. "I guess I would have to say if what I understand to be the case on the growth
of ADR within our society, it would suggest to me that it must be worldng and working well." Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
119. These findings are generally consistent with the "RAND Report" in finding
that lawyers and litigants generally believe that mediation is appropriate in court
suits. The RAND Report included a study of court-annexed mediation programs in
four federal district courts. Following cases that were assigned to ADR (including two
programs featuring early neutral evaluation) or that were not assigned to ADR for
comparison, the researchers collected surveys from 1739 attorneys and 592 litigants,
reflecting response rates of 45% and 11%, respectively. Cases were generally assigned
to ADR or not under a random experimental design. See JAmEs S. KAKALn, ET AL., AN
EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CwL JusTICE REFORM AcT 269-75 (1996) (commonly referred to as the "RAND Report"). Almost all of the attorneys (94%) and 83% of the litigants whose cases were assigned to
mediation believe that it was appropriate to attempt mediation in their case. Id. at
364, 402 (with percentages based on the number of valid responses, i.e., excluding
surveys with missing data). The RAND Report was criticized by some in the mediation community for failing to show significant advantages over unmediated litigation.
See generally Craig McEwen, ManagingCorporateDisputing: Overcoming Barriersto
the Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 Omo
ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 1, 1-4 (1998) (collecting and summarizing analyses of the
RAND Report). However, the RAND results show that mediation participants generally have favorable opinions about mediation (though attorneys and litigants in unmediated cases also generally have favorable views about their cases). Medley and
Schellenberg developed a "civil mediation scale," combining responses to 14 items in a
survey of 226 Indiana attorneys in the sample with a 45% response rate. They found
that 60% had favorable views of civil mediation and 17% had unfavorable views. This
was more positive than the views reflected in a divorce mediation scale in which 45%
had favorable views and 24% had unfavorable views. Morris L. Medley & James A.
Schellenberg, Attitudes of Attorneys Toward Mediation, 12 MEDITION Q. 185, 194
(1994).
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Table 3. Belief in Mediation by Type of Respondent
Proportion of Cases

Outside
Counsel

Inside Counsel

Executives

Total

Less than half*

19

27

16

21

Half*

21

20

49

29

More than half*

60

53

35

50

Total

100

100

100

100

Average (on scale
from 0 to 10)

6.4

6.0

5.4

5.9

Number of

72

60

57

189

respondents

*percentage of respondents saying that mediation is appropriate in various proportions of
lawsuits involving a business

appropriate in business disputes. Those giving responses of"9" might
be considered in this category as well. 120 Overall, 13% of respondents
gave ratings of 9 or 10. This intensity of belief is concentrated in the
ranks of attorneys, as 18% of the outside counsel and 15% of the inside counsel gave those responses compared with only 5% of the executives. An additional 22% of outside counsel, 12% of inside counsel,
and 7% of executives gave responses of "8."
The qualitative interviews help flesh out what it means to "believe in" mediation. Some are true believers who have faith in ADR
and give glowing accounts like the following, which is based on frustration with the traditional court system:
ADR... beat[s] every other alternative. All the other alternatives have somebody angry. ADR doesn't ....

Those kinds of

things, where the parties resolve it, they resolve it. In the end,
they resolve it by doing something they don't do in court: they
shake hands. In court, you're not going to shake that bugger's
hand. You hate him. No matter how angry you are at the beginning, even if you win, you're still angry at the end. The emotions have become even worse. So, all you've managed to do is
cause animosity and ill will and all of that stuff. Nobody wins
120. This interpretation requires a plausible, though not necessarily correct, leap
of logic. It seems likely that people who believe that mediation is always or almost
always appropriate have beliefs that are resistant to change, but that is not necessarily the case.
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with that.... Anybody that Ive ever known that has used ADR
has been pleased with it.' 2 '
Others believe that mediation and other forms of ADR are sometimes appropriate, but are more cautious in their belief in mediation.
The following quote from an outside counsel represents the views of
many lawyers and executives who think that mediation is appropriate in some but certainly not all cases:
I generally agree with the notion that not all disputes have to be
fought until the last dog is hung, and that in the kinds of disputes where I think it can be helpful, it's really my obligation to
try to direct my client into earlier, cheaper, better resolution....
But [ADR is] not the be-all-and-end-all of dispute resolution.
rm skeptical about it as I try to be about everything I read
22
about business.'
Several attorneys noted how ADR has become trendy. "It" has
become a popular ideology that some people come to favor (or not).
Indeed, lawyers and executives and their firms may become identified
as "believers" or not:
My experience has been, for example, with large corporations,
in-house legal departments have sort of gotten the word that
"ADR is something we need to think about. It's important." So
one of the things people are always asking your firm is, "What
experience do you have in ADR? Are you believers in ADR?" 123
Several respondents described how it is sometimes a superficial
popular ideology that people may generally favor without knowing
much about. Indeed, as they learn more about it and how they might
use it in particular disputes, some supposed ideological supporters
24
get cold feet:'
It's funny, ADR was-maybe it still is-trendy. It was certainly
trendy four or five years ago, but it's been replaced by some
121. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994). Some questions in both the
qualitative and survey interviews dealt with ADR generally as well as mediation in
particular. See supra note 104. Although some of the questions and answers are
framed in terms of ADR generally, they may be relevant specifically to mediation as
well.
122. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
123. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
124. Cf. Sally Engle Merry & Susan Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JusTIC SYs. J. 151, 153 (1984) (ethnographic study of
two communities finding that although residents generally prefer to resolve disputes
informally, they often do not use ADR because, by the time a conflict is serious enough
to warrant outside intervention, mediation does not provide vindication, protection of
legal rights, advocacy of their behalf, or a third party determination of the truth and
wrongfulness of the other side).
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newer and trendier set of initials, TQM [total quality management] or something. It's whatever they read in Business Week
that week. You will have some clients say, "Well, we're in favor
of ADR." But when you actually bring them a case and say,
"You know, this thing is going to sit around in court for two-anda-half years and it's going to cost you this and it's going to do
that, and shouldn't we move it?," [they say,] "Well, I don't think
so."

12 5

These quotes provide a good sense of how often the respondents
believe that mediation is appropriate in business disputes. Also, the
quotes suggest that opinions about how often mediation is appropriate are reasonably good indicators of people's belief in mediation.
Part VI, supra, considers how respondents' belief in mediation is related to the other variables discussed in this article.
B.

Satisfaction with ADR

Many studies of ADR use measures of disputant satisfaction to
evaluate ADR procedures. 126 As in most studies, in this study, respondents' evaluations of their experiences with ADR are also generally quite favorable. Approximately three-quarters of respondents
who had some personal experience with ADR were satisfied with both
the process (76%) and results (73%). Only about ten percent said
that they were dissatisfied. 12 7 Evaluations of the process and results
are very highly correlated (r = .83).12 8 Unlike belief in mediation,
125. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
126. See Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be or... ?, 70 N.D. L. REy. 381, 385-90
(1994) (noting that numerous studies find that disputants in ADR procedures are
more satisfied than disputants in non-ADR disputing procedures); Esser, supra note
2, at 529, 532-33 (noting that numerous studies find that disputants in ADR procedures are more satisfied than disputants in non-ADR disputing procedures).
127. The results in this study are comparable to those in the RAND Report for
attorneys although a smaller proportion of litigants in the RAND study expressed
satisfaction than in this study. Of the attorneys, 73% reported being satisfied with
the outcome and 66% reported satisfaction with the mediation. See KAKALIK ET AL.,
supra note 119, at 369 (percentages based on total number of valid responses). Only
about half of litigants expressed satisfaction with the outcome (49%) or the mediation
(50%). Id. at 404. Generally, the satisfaction of attorneys and litigants whose cases
were mediated was not significantly different than those whose cases were not litigated. Id. at 297-303 (based on question referring to "overall court management of
this case"). The results in this project are consistent with a survey of inside and
outside counsel that found that both groups were more satisfied than dissatisfied with
mediation. The results were based on a sample of 246 corporate counsel in Fortune
1000 companies and outside counsel specializing in litigation and business insurance.
The response rate appears to be 11%. See DELOITrE & TOUCHE, DELOIrE & TOUCHE
LITIGATION SERVICES 1993 SURVEY OF GENERAL AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL 1, 11 (1993).
128. For discussion of correlation, see supra note 106.
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there was no significant difference in satisfaction with the results or
process of their ADR experiences by type of respondent or state. L'
The similarity in satisfaction with ADR by type of respondent also
contrasts with the stark differences between the attorneys and executives in their satisfaction with litigation, about which the outside
counsel were much more satisfied than the executives. 130
The following statement by the general counsel of a major manufacturing firm is a typical testimonial:
Certainly my empirical experience and this company's empirical
experience is that ADR is far less expensive than litigation in
resolving disputes, and that's ultimately what litigation is all
about. I think you can get to the heart of the matter a lot
13 1
quicker and again with a lot less expense.
One might expect that satisfaction with ADR would be related to
amount of ADR experience. Amount of experience as a neutral in
ADR (e.g., as a mediator or arbitrator) is mildly correlated with satisfaction with the results (r = .18), and is not significantly correlated
with satisfaction with the process in their ADR experiences. Amount
of experience as a partisanin ADR (e.g., as a party or attorney representing a party) is not significantly correlated with satisfaction with
either the results or process. This lack of significant correlation between amount of experience and satisfaction with ADR found in the
survey would probably be surprising to many people sympathetic to
greater ADR use, as many believe that ADR experience and satisfaction go hand-in-hand. For example, an attorney who is generally satisfied with his ADR experiences said:
I have certainly had people say that they're skeptical. Typically
those have been people who haven't tried it.... I don't know
people who have been through the experience who are negative
about it. Some people certainly have been through bad experiences where the case hasn't settled. But I don't know anyone
who said that, "It was a waste of my time," because I think the
collateral benefits of knowing your case better and sooner are
32
going to be there.'
Respondents generally gave more favorable evaluations of their
ADR experiences than their non-ADR litigation experiences.'33 More
129. In the rest of the presentation of the data, differences by type of respondent
will generally be noted only when statistically significant.
130. See Lande, FailingFaith, supra note 95, at 23.
131. Interview with inside counsel 3 (Mar. 9, 1994).
132. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
133. The distinction between litigation and ADR is not as clear as it might seem
because much ADR activity takes place in the context of litigation. See Galanter, The
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than half (53%) of the respondents rated the results of ADR more favorably than the results of litigation, and more than two-thirds (68%)
rated the process in ADR more favorably. 1 34 Less than a third (29%)
rated the results of litigation more favorably than ADR and only 14%
rated the process of litigation more favorably. This extends findings
of other empirical research that fairly consistently indicate that disputants in ADR processes are more satisfied than disputants in litigation generally. 13 5
Compared with the attorneys, executives are much more satisfied with ADR than litigation. As there is no significant difference
between the three groups' evaluations of ADR, the difference in relative evaluations is a reflection of executives' greater distaste for litigation than greater absolute satisfaction with ADR. The attorneys
also gave high satisfaction ratings to ADR, although a substantial
minority-especially of outside counsel and especially regarding
the
results-gave higher ratings to their litigation experiences. Thus,
91% of executives, 68% of inside counsel, and 60% of outside counsel
gave higher ratings to ADR regarding satisfaction with the process.
Regarding satisfaction with the results, 78% of the executives, 54% of
inside counsel, and 44% of outside counsel gave higher ratings to
ADR. Even for the outside counsel regarding satisfaction with the
results, this represented a plurality of the outside counsel, as 16%
gave the same ratings to ADR and litigation, and 41% gave higher
ratings to litigation. 136
These statistical comparisons reflect a general thinking pattern
in which respondents evaluated ADR by comparison with traditional
litigation. One indicator was that many survey respondents decided
on ratings for questions about ADR by referring to their ratings of
comparable items about litigation. This pattern is also very common
in everyday conversation. For example, in describing why he thinks
Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. Disp. RESOL. 55, 61-62 (1988). Indeed, ADR, especially
mediation, has become so incorporated into the routine process of pretrial litigation,
especially in Florida and Massachusetts, that they are hard to separate in practice.
See Lande, supra note 1, at 845-47 (describing "liti-mediation" culture where mediation is the normal way to end litigation). Nonetheless, people obviously think of the
two quite differently, as this study suggests. Despite the close inter-relationship between ADR and litigation, for linguistic simplicity, they will be referred to as if they
are clearly distinct.
134. This analysis is based on the comparison of respondents' answers to separate
questions about litigation and ADR rather than asking the respondents to compare
the different processes. See Part III, supra, for description of "relative" measures.
135. See Esser, supra note 2, at 529, 532-33.
136. The total of ratings by outside counsel regarding the results does not add to
100% due to rounding.
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that businesses should routinely consider using ADR, an attorney
made the following comparison with litigation:
The principal reason is economic, unfortunately. It's too expensive to go to court anymore. Many of these [ADR procedures]
work quite well. rve used all of them and I'd say in the majority
of the cases, you don't get rid of it all the way, but you get closer.
In many, you do resolve it entirely. It saves people's time, a
great deal of aggravation and potential anger and problems and
financially. So I think it's economic and it's also from the point
of view of a company's functioning and how one feels about other
13 7
people. It's usually a more pleasant way to go.
Similarly, another attorney explained his preference for ADR
(and especially mediation) by comparing goals in ADR and trial:
In the courtroom, you're stuck with certain rules and all of that
stuff. You're also caught in an adversarial battle. In an ADR
situation, when it is the two of you and then a mediator or
whatever, ideally... all three of you have one goal: to resolve
it. Whereas in a courtroom, you've got two parties whose goals
are not to resolve it-it's to duke it out and the judge is to sort of
weigh in with who won. So you've got nobody pulling this whole
thing together to come up with a common resolution. ADR is
good because it does that. 138
In sum, respondents generally reported high levels of satisfaction
with their personal experiences with ADR, both absolutely and relative to litigation without ADR.
C. Expected PersonalConsequences of IncreasedADR Use
One might expect that belief in mediation would be especially
related to perceptions about how increased mediation use would affect respondents' personal interests. This might be particularly true
of business lawyers and executives, two groups that are widely perceived to be self-interested and results-oriented. Certainly there is
much sociological theory predicting such relationships.' 3 9
Respondents were asked about their expectations of the consequences if there were a "substantial increase in the proportion of
cases" in which their firm' 40 or a major business client of their
137.
138.
139.
140.

Interview with outside counsel 2 (Apr. 16, 1994).
Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
See supra Part II.B.
This version of the question was used with executives and inside counsel.
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firm 14 1

used ADR. Respondents were asked about five types of consequences for them (or people like them) 142 of increased ADR usage:
(a) effect on their personal compensation, (b) opportunity for advancement, (c) their relative importance within their firm (hereinafter
"prestige"), (d) their ability to work independent of direction of colleagues in other professions (hereinafter "autonomy"), 143 and (e) their
ability to do work they find very satisfying.
Large proportions of all three types of respondents believe that
there would probably be no changes for them in any of these ways if
there were a substantial shift of dispute handling toward greater
ADR use. Although statistical tests do not indicate many significant
differences in the average responses of the three types of respondents, the distributions do vary substantially.
First consider the expected effects on compensation. Respondents generally believe that increasing the proportion of the disputes
handled through ADR procedures by their firm or major client would
not affect their own individual compensation. More than threequarters of the inside counsel (78%) and executives (79%) gave this
response, as did half of the outside counsel (51%). Almost none of the
inside counsel or executives expected that an increase in the proportion of cases using ADR would decrease their compensation, whereas
a quarter of outside counsel (25%) gave this response. This difference
is not as sharp as it might seem, considering that most of the outside
counsel who expected a decrease gave a "4" rating, indicating only a
small expected decrease in compensation. Indeed, the difference between the average response of outside counsel and the other two
groups of respondents is not statistically significant.
141. This version of the question was used with outside counsel.
142. Respondents were asked about their expectations of the probable consequences of increased volume of litigation for "typical" members of the class of respondent that they belonged to (i.e., attorneys in private firms, inside counsel, or top
executives). In preliminary interviews in which respondents were asked about probable effects for them personally, several respondents had difficulty addressing the
question because of what they said were idiosyncratic elements in their organizations.
In response to questions about "typical" members of their class of respondent, many
respondents explicitly based their responses on the situation in their own organizations, and probably many did so implicitly. Thus, responses to these questions are
likely to reflect how respondents perceive their own current situations or similar situations in other firms where they might expect to work in the future.
143. For each group of respondents, the question referred to the position of those
most likely to have formal authority or practical influence over the respondents' activities. The question for outside counsel referred to autonomy from top executives of
their major business client (whose ADR use increased). The question for inside counsel referred to autonomy from top executives of their firms. The question for executives referred to autonomy from the firms' lawyers.
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Expectations about the effect on opportunities for advancement
of increased use of ADR are somewhat similar to expectations about
compensation. More than half of outside counsel (57%) and inside
counsel (53%) and almost three-quarters of executives (73%) doubt
that there would be any effect on advancement. However, almost half
of inside counsel (45%) believe that increased use of ADR would increase opportunities for advancement, compared with about a third of
outside counsel (29%), and a quarter of executives (25%). Virtually no
inside counsel or executives think that it would decrease advancement opportunities, whereas 13% of outside counsel expect that effect. Again, the differences are not statistically significant, although
the shapes of the distributions are quite different, as outside counsels' responses were more widely distributed than those of inside
counsel or executives.
There is, however, a clear difference in expectations about effect
on prestige of increased ADR use. More than two-thirds of inside
counsel (69%) believe that their prestige would increase, compared
with less than one quarter of executives (23%) and one third of
outside counsel (32%). By contrast, more than half of the outside
counsel (57%) and almost three-quarters of executives (73%) believe
that there would be no change in their prestige if their firm or major
client used more ADR, compared with less than a third of inside
counsel (28%) who believe so. Only 10% of outside counsel and less
than five percent of inside counsel and executives believe that in44
creased ADR use would hurt their prestige.
About half of each type of respondent believe that increased ADR
use would not affect their professional autonomy. Executives may expect that increased ADR use would enhance their professional autonomy more than outside counsel do.' 4 5 Forty percent of executives and
inside counsel expect this effect, compared with 22% of outside counsel. The distribution of inside counsel's responses is close to that of
the executives but not significantly different than outside counsel.
A somewhat larger proportion of inside counsel (43%) than
outside counsel (34%) expect that increased ADR use would increase
opportunities to do satisfying work. Only one third of inside counsel
144. Zariski's survey of Western Australian attorneys found that 71% disagreed
with the proposition that their standing amongst colleagues might suffer if they participated more often in non-judicial dispute resolution processes, compared with only
8% who agreed. Zariski, supra note 5, at app. A §15.
145. Statistical analysis indicates that the differences between executives and
outside counsel are almost but not quite statistically significant. For discussion of the
statistical analysis, see Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra note 95, at 146 n.9.
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(33%) expect no effect, compared with more than half of the outside
counsel (55%). The distribution of executives' responses-44% of
whom expect an increase and 48% of whom expect no change-is in
between the two groups of attorneys, though not significantly different than either.
Overall, many respondents believe that if their firm or major client increased its ADR use, they would not be personally affected. To
the extent that they do expect any effects of greater ADR use, the
three types of respondents perceive different consequences. As a
group, outside counsel reflect greater variation and somewhat more
misgivings about personal consequences of increased ADR use than
the other two types of respondents. For example, of the outside counsel who believe that increased ADR use by a major business client
would affect their compensation, roughly equal proportions believe
that greater ADR use would increase their compensation as believe
that it would decrease it. One commonly-held view among outside
counsel is that increased use of ADR would lose advantages for their
clients and themselves; thus, these lawyers may be reluctant to suggest it. Here, a general counsel describes this perspective of outside
counsel by contrasting it with perspectives of inside counsel:
It's always difficult getting attorneys to make a move that they
think might lose them some advantage. That may be more the
case if you're dealing with outside attorneys than with inside
counsel where you have perhaps more of a feeling that you're
making a determination strictly on a legal basis and your duty
to vigorously defend your client. I'll take the charitable approach to that. There's also the perspective of how does that cut
into [their] business as opposed to someone who's inside the corporation who's not looking at it necessarily from quite that
strong of a perspective but is looking at all the business inter14 6
ests ... of the company.
Some attorneys distinguish short-term and long-term consequences of ADR use, suggesting that outside counsel and their law
firms might lose fees in the short-term but gain in the long-term due
to enhanced reputations and increased referrals. The division of
opinion between outside counsel in the phone survey may be a reflection of some who focused on perceived short-term losses and others
who focused on longer-term gains. One outside counsel described the
differences this way:
[If] I suggested ADR and as a result we settled the case without
spending gobs of money on lawyers, I suppose it could have a
146.

Interview with inside counsel 4 (Mar. 16, 1994).
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negative effect on my compensation in the sense that there's
been less legal work generated and so less fees generated and
therefore less income. On the other hand, if you get a good result and you have a happy client and word gets out, long-term
maybe that ends up being to your benefit because you'll have
more business coming in because you've gotten a good economical result for the client. They haven't had any experience with,
14 7
"Oh my God, we spent $1 million in legal fees on that firm."
-A senior partner in a law firm elaborated on the consequences of
suggesting ADR in his firm:
Question: Do you think that suggesting or using ADR affects your prestige with your colleagues, supervisors, or clients?
Answer: I think it helps. I think to have a reputation for
being able to solve your clients' problems is the best reputation
to have with colleagues.
Question: Do you think that lawyers suggesting or using
ADR, for example within this firm or others like it, would affect
their opportunities for advancement?
Answer: We like ADR.... We've made a commitment to
familiarize ourselves with the processes and to bring them to
our clients' attention. IfI were to find out that one of my associates had an opportunity to do that and didn't do it, I'd be
unhappy.'
Similarly, substantial numbers of executives see a potential for
increased autonomy and work satisfaction, and many inside counsel
see potential advantages in terms of advancement, prestige, autonomy, and opportunities to do satisfying work. One attorney suggested that if a business used ADR, it would reflect well on both the
inside counsel and top executives. Like the preceding accounts of the
outside counsel, this assessment is based on a recurrent assumption
that the business using ADR would receive at least as good results,
14 9
but with reduced time and expense:
[If a business used ADR regularly] I think the business presidents, maybe the general counsel too, [in other companies]
would say, "That's a smartly run company because they're not
spending all of this money on legal fees."... They would have to
be high on an esteem list. And their general counsel and the
president of that company would be the hero. Here's a guy or a
woman who's got a company that's clicking. They know their
147. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
148. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
149. About 75% of all three types of respondents believe that mediated cases are
resolved faster and at less cost than cases without mediation. See infra Part Vi).
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expenses. They're not afraid to protect their rights, but they do
it in a sensible way. 150
In sum, large proportions of respondents do not think that
greater ADR use would affect them personally. To the extent that
they expect a change, more inside counsel and executives expect that
the change would be favorable than unfavorable, whereas the outside
counsel are more divided.
D. Time and Expense of Mediation
ADR is frequently advertised as producing advantages over litigation, generally regarding the costs and time involved in disputing.151 Respondents in this study were asked, "Considering how long
you think that lawsuits should take realistically, in lawsuits where
mediation is used, how often are the suits resolved within an appropriate amount of time?" 15 2 They were then asked a similar question
about how often suits are resolved at an appropriate cost. Respondents generally agree that cases handled in mediation are often resolved within appropriate periods of time and at appropriate costs.
Most respondents think that more than half of these cases are resolved at appropriate cost (56%) and within appropriate time (55%),
and an additional 19% of respondents think that half of these cases
are appropriate in cost and time.' 53 Responses to these two questions are highly correlated (r = .70).
The responses to these questions provide good illustrations of differences in opinions about the courts and ADR. Comparing responses
to questions about lawsuits with and without the references to mediation reveals that more than three-quarters of respondents believe
that mediation provides time (81%) and cost (80%) advantages over
150. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
151. See, e.g., GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8; Galanter & Lande, supra note
37, at 395-97.
152. This was the same question that was asked earlier in the survey about litigation, except that this question includes the phrase "in lawsuits where mediation is
used." Since it is commonplace to complain about the cost and delay of litigation, the
question included the prefatory phrase asking respondents to judge based on what
they believed to be realisticexpectations.
153. In the RAND study, the attorneys were generally satisfied with the time and
expense of mediated cases but the litigants were more mixed. The vast majority of
attorneys said that the case took a reasonable amount of time (84%) and the attorneys
fees and costs were about right (75%), compared with only 49% of litigants who said
that the amount of time was reasonable and 42% who said that the attorneys fees and
costs were about right. KAKALU ET AL., supra note 119, at 356, 360, 394, 397 (percentages based on number of valid responses). The RAND Report does not report significance tests comparing mediated and unmediated cases, though the reported
frequencies look quite similar to each other. See id.
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litigation in which mediation is not used.'rA Only eight percent gave
responses indicating that the appropriateness of the time and expense of lawsuits is greater without mediation than with it. As noted
above, many lawyers and executives believe that ADR produces outcomes that are at least as favorable for businesses as litigation, but at
a lower cost. An inside counsel said:
I think [businesses] should try [ADRI in every [case].... It just
makes a heck of a lot more sense. If you can resolve it face to
face, sitting down just talking, businesspeople to businesspeople, you don't even have to have lawyers in the room.... I
mean it's somebody to make people think about the consequences before they charge off the cliff... You don't have all of
those legal fees. And you probably come out with a better answer anyway. Litigated answers usually aren't very good. 1r'
One executive said, about cost advantages of ADR over litigation,
"It's a hell of a lot less costly to go that route than to go through the
costs of the legal system."15 6 Another described how ADR provides
relief from the frustrations of delay, expense, and uncertainty of
adjudication:
I think we all know that the courts are so horribly crowded that
the case loads just take forever. They drag on. You invariably
get tremendous delays because the court must deal with felonies
first and then you get to the civil people. You think you've got a
date for next Friday and you're prepared to go on next Friday.
You've brought in your witnesses and the court says, "I can't
154. This is similar to the finding that 63% of lawyers in a random sample of Indiana State Bar Association members believe that mediation significantly reduces the
time necessary for a civil non-family case to be concluded. Sixty-one percent disagreed with the notion that mediation tends to add significantly to costs. See Medley
& Schellenberg, supra note 119, at 190. In the survey of Minnesota attorneys, 68%
said that they voluntarily choose mediation because it saves litigation expenses, the
largest single reason cited. See McADoo, supra note 111, at app. 0-14. Forty-six percent said that mediation saves expenses for their clients, and 60% said that it causes
earlier settlements. See id. at app. 0-16. The Deloitte and Touche survey of outside
and inside counsel found that saving time and expense were the most important reasons for using ADR methods and were rated as providing more satisfaction than other
aspects of the processes such as avoiding precedents, using the expertise of third parties, and preserving relationships. Dfzorrr Arm ToucHE, supra note 127, at 8-9. Unlike the Deloitte and Touche survey, which asked the same question about the
importance of different aspects of disputing procedures, the questions in the present
study asked different questions about these aspects of disputing procedures; thus, the
results are not precisely comparable. A survey of 606 inside counsel of Fortune 1000
companies found that more than 80% believe that mediation saves time and money.
See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control:The CorporateEmbrace ofADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EiPLOY xnT L. 133, 138 (1998).
155. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
156. Interview with executive 2 (Apr. 8, 1994).
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because I've got a drug dealer that we just captured and he's
going up on Friday." "Okay, when am I going to go [to trial]?"
"Well we don't really know. Well let you know in September."
That's not the way to run the railroad, but that's what we're up
against. So yes, I would say in civil tort cases, I think that all of
those should immediately be handled by people who can hear
them right away, and who can handle them on a dispute resolution basis immediately. Because then you know where you're
going before you even think about going through all of the terri157
ble, terrible expense of going to court.
Some respondents temper their generally positive view of the
cost-saving potential of ADR by noting the possibility of adding costs,
however:
If [ADR is] non-binding, it is costly to do. And so the matter in
dispute really has to be worth that kind of potential cost addition.... I don't know how you can do any of these ADR procedures without having really completed your discovery. And we
all know that it is in the area of discovery that legal costs are in
a runaway condition in the types of disputes you and I are talking about.
Most, if not all, of that is done by the time you do an
58
ADR.I

Thus, while the respondents do not always believe that mediation saves time and money, most believe that it usually does.
E. Relational Factors
Preservation and rehabilitation of relationships is often cited as
one of the distinctive potential advantages of mediation as compared
with other disputing methods.' 5 9 The respondents in this study generally believe that mediation is sensitive to business needs and helps
preserve business relationships. Over three-quarters of respondents
(80%) said that mediation helps preserve business relationships 6 °
157. Interview with executive 4 (Apr. 7, 1994).
158. Interview with outside counsel 3 (Mar. 23, 1994).
159. See, e.g., BusH &

FOLGER,

supra note 7, at 20-22; see also Robert A. Baruch

Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition? The Mediator's

Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. Rlv. 253, 270-73 (1991).
160. These findings are consistent with a survey of 606 inside counsel of Fortune
1000 companies in which 59% said that one of the reasons they use mediation is to
preserve relationships. See Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 154, at 139. Also consistent
with these findings are the comments of one inside counsel interviewed for McEwen's
study of business disputing, who said, "Most disputes are resolved immediately in the
interest of the relationship." McEwen, supra note 119, at 14. Zariski also found that
77% of the attorneys responding to his survey agreed that business relationships involved in commercial disputes are preserved better by non-judicial dispute resolution
processes than by judicial processes. See Zariski, supra note 5. Possibly contrary to
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and two-thirds (67%) said that mediators and arbitrators generally
consider the needs and practices of particular business communities. 16 1 Responses to these two questions are significantly correlated
(r = .41), reflecting the importance of business relationships to business lawyers and executives. 16 2 Respondents overwhelmingly believe
that ADR is much more sensitive to business concerns than the
courts are. More than three-quarters (82%) gave higher ratings of
sensitivity to business needs and practices in a question about
mediators and arbitrators than in a comparable question about the
legal system generally.
Respondents were asked another question that tapped the extent
to which they valued ADR for non-economic reasons. They were
asked the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement,
"IfADR procedures take as much time and money as the courts, businesses generally would be better off using the courts to resolve their
disputes." 16 3 Overall, the respondents were closely divided, with 38%
saying that businesses would not be better off using the courts and
42% saying that businesses would be better off using the courts in
these circumstances. Perhaps surprisingly, more outside counsel
(47%) favored using alternatives to the courts than did the executives
(33%) in these situations. As usual, inside counsel's responses were
in between (43%) and not significantly different from the other two
the results in this article, only 14% of Minnesota attorneys said that they voluntarily
chose mediation because it helps preserve parties' relationships, although 62% report
that mediation is less adversarial than normal civil litigation. See McAnoo, supra
note 111, at app. C-14, 0-16. This difference may reflect a difference between conscious reasons for choosing a dispute resolution procedure and expected or observed
consequences of using the procedure. Somewhat contrary to the results presented in
this article, only 28%of attorneys in the RAND study said that mediation was helpful
in improving relationships, compared with 63% who said that it had no effect.
K
Ar
AL., supra note 119, at 367 (percentages based on number of valid responses). Similarly, in the Deloitte and Touche survey of outside and inside counsel,
respondents did not indicate that preserving relationships is an important reason for
using ADR. The Deloitte and Touche study also indicates that counsel were not as
satisfied with ADR in terms of preserving relationships as with other consequences
such as saving time and money. DELorrrE & ToucHE, supra note 127, at 8-9.
161. When asked whether businesses should routinely consider using ADR for
their disputes, an executive responded affirmatively, giving several reasons, including
the following- "It gets it into the hands of businesspeople that understand business
and understand the effects ofwhat's going on like in a business." Interview with executive 2 (Apr. 8, 1994).
162. One executive highlighted this quite directly when asked about important
factors in making decisions about business disputes. He said, "I think that continuing
relationships are very very important. You've got to make a decision whether you
want it to continue or not." Interview with executive 2 (Apr. 8, 1994).
163. In fact, most respondents do not accept the premise of this question about
time and cost of mediation being the same as litigation generally. See supra Part V.D.
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types of respondents. The average response for outside counsel is 5.0
on the 0 to 10 scale, suggesting ambivalence as a group. This compares with an average of 6.2 for executives, indicating a general preference for the courts in these situations. The average for inside
counsel is 5.4, suggesting a slight preference for the courts as a
group.
The survey included two other questions that did not specifically
mention ADR procedures, but referred to benefits that are frequently
attributed to mediation. In one question, respondents were asked
how often is it appropriate for businesses to try to find outcomes addressing the underlying interests of each party as opposed to seeking
the largest possible concessions. Although interest-based negotiation
is certainly not limited to mediation, 164 mediation is often touted as
providing greater opportunities for using this approach. 16 5 The socially desirable response for many people would be to state a very
high frequency, as it might seem selfish to tell a researcher that one
prefers to seek large concessions. To try to reduce this possible social
desirability effect, the question was prefaced with the phrase, "given
the practical realities of litigation between two businesses . ... "
Nonetheless, more than three-quarters (82%) of each type of respondent said that it would be appropriate to seek outcomes addressing
underlying interests in more than half the cases. Although the
outside counsel gave significantly higher responses (an average rating of 8.1) than executives (who gave an average rating of 7.2), clearly
the vast majority of all three types of respondents said that it is normally appropriate to focus on underlying interests. 16 6 One executive
gave an illustrative hypothetical situation:
The last thing you want to do is sue one of your regulators, even
though you're right under the law. This is not the thing to do.
You pick up the phone and you call George [last name] and you
say, "George, I'm having a problem within the bowels of your
organization. We think we're right. Our lawyers want to bring
a lawsuit, but I'd like to sit down and talk to you to you to see if
we can find a win-win here and interpret this thing." A lawsuit
is messy and polarizes people. 16 7
164. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WIT1I.
OUT GIVNG IN (2d ed. 1991) (advocating this approach in unmediated negotiation).
165. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 13, at 252-56.
166. Cf JONATHAN M. HYMAN ET AL., CML SETTLEMENT: STYLES OF NEGOTIATION
iN DispUTE REsOLUTION 63-64 (1995) (relating that 61% of attorneys in the survey say
that they would like to increase their use of problem-solving methods in negotiation).
167. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
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Referring to suits between two businesses, respondents were also
asked "how often is it appropriate to reach a settlement involving
outcomes other than, or in addition to, monetary payments?"68 Providing creative solutions that are not limited to monetary outcomes is
another widely cited benefit of mediation.' 6 9 Again, there was the
potential for socially desirable responses, so this question needs to be
interpreted carefully. More than half (53%) of all types of respondents said that non-monetary outcomes would be appropriate in more
than halfof cases and an additional 28% percent said that non-monetary outcomes are appropriate in half of cases. 170 There were no significant differences in average responses of the three types of
respondents.
From the responses to the preceding set of questions, it seems
clear that most respondents accept claims about mediation regarding
improving relationships, sensitivity to parties' interests, and valuing
efforts to craft solutions addressing those interests. In such cases,
168. The question was prefaced with the following statement: 'Alany lawsuits between two businesses are resolved by having the defendant make a payment to the
plaintiff. Some lawsuits are resolved by means other than or in addition to direct
monetary payments, such as by negotiation of a contract."
169. See, eg., GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 8. In the RAND study, attorneys
reported resolutions with non-monetary outcomes in about 14% of the mediated cases
and in about 10% of unmediated cases. K xAux Er AL., supra note 119, at 360 (percentages based on number of valid responses). It is not clear whether this difference
is statistically significant, though it suggests that participants do not frequently agree
to non-monetary terms in agreements in general civil mediation programs like the
ones studied by RAND. In McAdoo's survey of Minnesota lawyers, 6% said that settlements reached through ADR frequently or always include more non-monetary elements than non-ADR settlements, and 34% said that ADR settlements occasionally
include more non-monetary elements. See McADoo, supra note 111, at C-13.
170. Cf. Hvyim ET AL., supra note 166, at 62-64 (finding that most attorneys in
survey say that they would like to consider creative positional and problem-solving
options in negotiation). One executive in the present study gave an enthusiastic analysis about why disputes in ADR should be more prone to resolutions involving a nonmonetary component than traditional litigation:
The attorney taking the case, if they're not skilled or knowledgeable in the
particular industry or the commercial transaction, what else do they have to
go by? By some concept of dollars. And in theory, everything has a value or
we seek to put a monetary value on it. It's a common denominator, a market
clearing price that has a lot of merit in that perspective. But, I can only
wonder how many commercial disputes sort of hang out there, clog(ging) up
the courts and society because everybody has this paradigm that we're talking dollars as opposed to maybe we could use this dispute as an opportunity
to redefine our relationship. Or instead of it getting you to cut the price or
interpret the contract in such a way that I pay less, maybe we could extend
the contract for two years or something. In other words look for win-win.
Get to win-win as opposed to litigate to win-lose. Its a hell of a difference.
Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
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one might expect that top business executives would be satisfied with
the results. Indeed, respondents generally believe that business executives are satisfied with the results of lawsuits in which mediation
is used. Overall, more than three-quarters (84%) of the respondents
believe that top executives are satisfied in at least half the cases.
Comparing responses to this question and the same question without
reference to mediation reveals that about two-thirds of respondents
(68%) gave higher ratings of executives' satisfaction with mediated
results compared with 13% who gave higher ratings for the results of
litigation generally.
This question was originally intended as a catchall indicator of
favorability of results of the respective processes. Since top executives are typically the ultimate authorities to be satisfied in business
matters, their judgments (as perceived by respondents) were thought
to be a good standard for measuring outcomes. Not surprisingly,
however, many respondents seemed to focus on executives' reactions
and interactions with others in their organization. Therefore, this
question may indicate at least as much about effects on intra-organizational relationships as on evaluations of dispute results. 17 1 Indeed,
this factor is significantly correlated with the perception that mediation helps preserve relationships (r = .38).
One inside counsel provided some insight as to why mediation
may be more satisfying to executives-and the lawyers who represent them-than traditional litigation:
Sometimes businesspeople may intuitively know or have a belief
that there may have been a mistake made, but it's very hard for
them to go to their superior and say, "Look, we're wrong here."
If a third party-not the other side, because they're the devil,
but if a truly neutral third party-can objectively and cogently
state why [you're wrong], it's a lot easier to go back and say,
171. Perhaps not surprisingly, many respondents consider the economic and relational factors together, as much as researchers seek to separate them. Here, an executive describes the factors he believes are most important in making decisions about
business disputes:
Looking at the economic results, the more important factors to a businessperson, or certainly to me, is not just are we going to win the litigation, do we
have a right to do it, can we do it, but are we going to spend more money
doing it than the result? Having done it, is it going to give us a long-term
problem that we don't want to live with? Is it going to damage our reputation? ... So the bottom line is that many times we don't sue (a) when we
know that even if we get a judgment we can't collect, or (b) having done that,
we'll lose the customer, which is basically one of your questions, and damage
other relationships, or (c) this litigation could go on just forever and ever and
there's an open-ended problem there.
Interview with executive 4 (Apr. 7, 1994).
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"Well, so-and-so's a judge and he or she is like the judge who's
going to hear this and they say we've got a problem here." You
know, people are more accepting of objective advice and I think
once you start that process and there is a recognition of relative
fault-yours and others'-it's a beginning to starting a true
172
dialogue.
Although executives presumably do not like to be told that they
are wrong, they also presumably recognize that in some cases they
may be wrong legally and/or likely to lose their case. While they cannot trust the evaluation of their opponents, executives also may not
trust (or want) their own attorneys to provide a nonpartisan evaluation.1 73 Thus, executives may indeed value a process where they will
sometimes be told that they are wrong and can really believe it. Of
course, they may especially value such a process if the ADR neutral
tells the executives' opponents that the opponents are wrong. For example, one attorney described a case in which an ADR proceeding
affected the opposing party's evaluation of the case, thus facilitating
settlement:
rm thinking of one particular example where there was clearly
some exposure on the part of my client. We were the defendant.... The plaintiff was completely unrealistic about the merits of his claim and particularly about his damage claim and
what he was likely to recover. This is a case where we went
through the summary jury trial 17 4 and the result of that was
that there was a finding of liability but an award of damages
that was in the neighborhood of what we had always expected
would be an appropriate damage award and at least a decimal
point away from what the plaintiff had ever been at before in
172. Interview with inside counsel 3 (Mar. 9, 1994). Cf. McEwen et al., supra note
87, at 164-67 (noting how divorce attorneys have a difficult time giving clients bad
news about a case, and how mediation helps by having a mediator and the opposing
side help the client see the case more clearly).
This quote refers to an "evaluativeP version of mediation in which mediators express opinions about the merits of the case. Evaluative mediation is quite controversial. See Lande supra note 1, at 850-851. It is also probably quite common, especially
in civil mediation.

173. Cf

SA~RAT

&FELsTIER, supra note 54, at 26-52 (finding, in divorce cases at

least, that it is not unusual for clients to doubt their attorneys' assessments and
advice).
174. As this passage suggests, a summary jury trial involves brief presentations to
a jury that renders a non-binding decision. The decision is used as the basis for further negotiations. See GOLBERG T AL., supra note 5, at 286. This is somewhat similar to an evaluative form of mediation in which mediators provide their assessments
of the merits of the case to focus negotiations in particular directions. See Leonard L.
Riskin, UnderstandingMediators' Orientations,Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid
for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOTIATION L. Rnv. 7,44-45 (1996).
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terms of settlement.... I consider that to be a favorable result
for my client even though we ended up spending approximately
a quarter of a million dollars in settlement. Before that time,
we just 5couldn't get the plaintiff down under two million
dollars.17
Thus, mediation can help attorneys and executives solve the organizational problem of rationalizing settlements to clients. 176 The
preceding two quotes suggest that the attorneys believe that the formal outcomes were about the same as they would have been if they
had been tried in court. When respondents speak about more
favorable outcomes, they may be factoring in the traditional benefits
of settlement, such as reduced risk and litigation costs. Of course,
settlement conferences conducted by sitting public judges often serve
this purpose as well.' 7 7 Perhaps respondents believe that mediators
perform this function more often or better than judges in court settlement conferences. Part of the confidence in mediation may be based
on the premise that it is conducted early in the dispute before "you've
already engaged in all of the 20 or 30 depositions etc. [and] you've
spent all the money," 178 whereas judicial settlement conferences
often occur late in the dispute. 7 9 Indeed, it may be easier to use this
third-party neutral opinion to help persuade top executives to settle if
it is obtained before the firm is substantially invested in the dispute
both financially and psychologically.
The findings in this Part indicate that business lawyers and executives generally believe that mediation improves relationships and
is oriented to the interests of the parties (at least the interests of the
business entities). For many, considerations such as these would justify using mediation even without time or cost savings.
F. Level of Specialized Skill and Knowledge Involved in Mediation
One might generally assume that professional mediators claim,
implicitly or explicitly, that they offer a service requiring some special skill or knowledge. If not, why would parties invest their time
and money to engage the mediators' services? Why not simply go to
175.
176.

Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994).
See McEwen et al., supra note 87, at 164-67.
177. See generally WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETILING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS
ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFcTIvE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES (1985).
178. Interview with inside counsel 3 (Mar. 9,1994).
179. The assumption of ADR proceedings occurring early in the dispute is not always warranted, especially when ADR is mandated by the courts. Some respondents
said that in their courts, they went to court-ordered mediation late in the process and
thus did not gain the benefits of early resolution.

HeinOnline -- 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 192 2000

Spring 20001

Getting the Faith

a bartender or hairdresser for help in resolving disputes? While specialized skill and knowledge seem like generally plausible (at least
perceived) requirements for most professional services,' 8 0 this may
be less so for mediation, which primarily involves negotiation. Consider that even young children negotiate on a regular basis (often
with favorable results, as most parents can probably attest). On the
other hand, given a general distaste for the litigation process and its
complexity, many people might prefer a simpler approach to mediation that seems like "common sense." To test this, the survey asked
whether respondents think that "knowledge about mediation procedures is more a matter of common sense or specialized skill and
learning."
The business lawyers and executives in this study think that mediation involves a mix of common sense and specialized skill and
knowledge, with most responses centering around the midpoint of the
11-point rating scale. Overall, the responses lean toward the specialized end of the continuum with somewhat less than half (44%) of
respondents saying that mediation involves more specialized skill
and knowledge compared with about a quarter (23%) who say it is
more a matter of common sense.
For some people, being a mediator (or providing other ADR services) is just like any other profession, i.e., one requiring specialized
knowledge and skills. One executive stated, "If my job is to go and
build bridges, I need to approach my first bridge with some specialized training in how to do load calculations. That's just training to
get to the table to practice my profession. I would see dispute resolution the same way."' 8 '
Unlike the skills in building bridges, however, negotiation and
problem-solving skills are part of the stock-and-trade of lawyers and
executives. Thus, part of the rationale that mediation (or perhaps
what is considered to be good mediation) primarily requires common
sense may be based on the notion that the skills required to be a mediator are similar to the specialized skills that lawyers develop. For
example, one lawyer described his experience with ADR that led him
to believe that it involves special skills:
I don't think it's more common sense.... Certainly the first
time I was exposed to it, I was surprised how a formalized sort

180. For discussion of the importance of claims of specialized knowledge and skill
for professional legitimacy, see supra, Part HA
181. Interview with executive 3 (Apr. 15, 1994).
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of structure like a mini-trial 182 would actually move people towards a resolution [rather] than otherwise. Common sense
might tell us that it should be resolved, but the problem,
mechanically, is how you bring them to see it in the right
way.... And I don't think there are skills remarkably different
from litigation skills involved in being the advocate in the ADR
18 3
process.
Interestingly, another attorney used similar reasoning to reach
the opposite conclusion:
[I think it is more] common sense. You go to seminars that talk
about negotiation techniques and my view is that if 90% of what
they're telling you doesn't strike you as just being plain old common sense, you're probably going to have a hell of a time being
an effective negotiator anyway. Because if you have to try to
learn all this stuff and it doesn't come second nature to you, it's
going to be difficult. And the best negotiators are people that I
think are naturallysomeone who isn't going to respond to everything you've said by taking the bait and finding the points of
contention.184
Another attorney gave a similar, but more concise, no-nonsense
perspective on this question: "Specialized skills is a bunch of hogwash. What sounds reasonable and fair? Rights are rights and liabilities are liabilities." 185 Some respondents may have indicated that
knowledge about mediation itself is more common sense, but may
value specialized skill in the subject of the dispute:
Well, if you get knowledgeable people in the field that you're
dealing with, let's say there's a dispute in microbiology. [Courts
should consider referring cases to ADR if it's to] people that are
familiar with that field in that they can understand the depths
of the field and also that understand the parameters involved in
18 6
handling a dispute. How do you handle the economics?
182. Mini-trials have a somewhat misleading name, as the prescribed form is
closer to mediation than a trial. They are typically used in disputes between two
businesses or other organizations and involve a panel composed of top executives from
both entities. Attorneys for each side give summaries of their legal arguments and
then the panel, with the assistance of a neutral advisor, attempts to negotiate a settlement. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 5, at 281-83.
183. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994).
184. Interview with outside counsel 4 (Mar. 18, 1994). This quote reflects a common confusion between skills used in negotiation and mediation, which are generally
quite similar, albeit with some differences.
185. Interview with inside counsel 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
186. Interview with executive 2 (Apr. 7, 1994). Indeed, knowledge of the substantive area of a dispute was the important qualification mentioned most often (84%) by
Minnesota attorneys in McAdoo's study. About 66% said that the mediator being a
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These responses indicate that business lawyers and executives
believe that mediation involves a mix of specialized skill and common
sense. Overall, it may involve more specialized skill, but it still entails a healthy dose of common sense, according to the respondents.
G. Perceptionof Leaders' Opinions
One might expect that respondents' opinions would be related to
the perceived opinions of their professional leaders and organizational superiors. This Part examines perceived opinions of these key
actors about ADR and relates them to respondents' own views.' 8 v
Respondents were asked whether they thought that organizational superiors and professional leaders' 8 8 have favorable or unfavorable opinions about ADR. The patterns of responses are generally
parallel to the pattern of the respondents' own opinions about ADR.
The perceived opinions of organizational superiors and professional
leaders about ADR are generally favorable. The lawyers (especially
the outside counsel) more than the executives, tend to believe that
these leaders have favorable opinions about ADR.
Overall, a majority of respondents said that their organizational
superiors have favorable opinions about ADR. This includes about
60% of inside and outside counsel and 43% of the executives,
although the difference in average response between types of respondents is not quite statistically significant. One-fifth or less of all
three groups said that they thought that their organizational superiors had unfavorable views of ADR.
Respondents generally believe that the leaders in theirprofession
also have favorable opinions about ADR. Overall, about two-thirds of
respondents gave this response. A somewhat larger percentage of
outside counsel (77%) than inside counsel (63%) and executives (51%)
said that their professional leaders have favorable views of ADR.
This difference may be due to executives' relative unfamiliarity with
ADR in their own right as well as uncertainty about others' opinions.
litigator is an important qualification, and only 43%said having mediation training is
an important qualification. McADoo, supra note 111, at C-19.
187. For reasons why respondents' opinions may be linked to those of organizational and professional leaders, see supra Part HIA, discussing professional leaders'
increased interest in ADR.
188. For definition of "organizational superior' as used in this study, see supra
Part IV-A. As indicated in Part IVA, some but not all of the organizational superiors
are "top executives" referred to in a question analyzed in Part V.E.
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As noted in Part II.B, supra, there has been a national campaign
for businesses and law firms to adopt policies calling for consideration of ADR in business disputes. Obviously, such policies or organizational practices might contribute to a belief in mediation by the
respondents. About a third of all three types of respondents say that
their firm has a formal or informal policy to consider using ADR in its
disputes (36%), or to use ADR contract clauses (34%).189 Respondents' reports about the existence of two types of policies in their
firms are significantly correlated (r = .50). Relatively few respondents reported that their firms adopted official policies directing consideration of ADR (15%) or use of ADR clauses (10%), and there were
not significant differences between types of respondents in this regard. More often, respondents said that their firms had adopted such
practices without official policies; 21% reported unofficial policies
favoring consideration of ADR, and 24% reported unofficial policies
favoring use of ADR contract clauses. Of course, such policies do not
necessarily translate completely into practice. Amount of experience
as a partisan in ADR is only weakly correlated with a firm's policy to
consider using ADR (r = .17) and is not significantly correlated with a
policy of using ADR contract clauses. As one attorney put it, "A lot of
[top business executives] have signed the CPR pledge themselves.
Again, I don't always see them as willing once a dispute begins to get
into them. In theory, that's the thing to be in favor of."190
These findings indicate that respondents generally believe that
the leaders of their professions and their organizational superiors
189. ADR contract clauses provide for ADR procedures to be used if there is a
dispute arising from the contract. Outside counsel were asked about the contracts
that their firms' attorneys draft. Inside counsel and executives were asked about the
contracts used by their firms. It is possible that more firms have policies or practices
to use ADR clauses than is reflected in this survey. Many of the outside counsel are in
litigation departments, and some said that contracts would typically be drafted by
attorneys in other departments and that they (the respondents) would not necessarily
be aware of such policies or practices. Similarly, executives may not be aware of dispute resolution clauses in contracts or a generic ADR policy.
The Zariski survey of Western Australia attorneys found that 45% reported that
their firms had an official or unofficial policy to consider using ADR, while 43% reported having no such policy. Thirty-one percent said that there was an official or
unofficial policy to use ADR clauses in contracts, while 37% said that there was no
such policy. Zariski, supra note 5.
190. Interview with outside counsel 1 (Mar. 17, 1994). McEwen found a similar
phenomenon with some inside counsel in his study of six corporations. McEwen,
supra note 119, at 13 (quoting an attorney: "We are pro-ADR in theory but when you
get down to specifics, it's a hard pill to swallow. We haven't seen many opportunities
to use it."). McEwen generally found a lack of connection between corporate ADR
policy and actual ADR usage. Of the six corporations he studied, two rarely initiated
ADR, two did so occasionally, and two were strongly committed to ADR, especially
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have favorable opinions about ADR, and that about one-third of respondents are aware of policies in their organizations favoring use of
ADR in business disputes. There is not a strong correlation between
existence of these policies and respondents' perceptions that their organizational superiors have favorable views of mediation, indicating
that respondents rely on other cues in assessing the leaders' views.
VI.

CORRELATES OF BELIEF IN MEDIATION

This Part analyzes correlations of belief in mediation with the
variables described in the preceding Part to help explain why business lawyers and executives support mediation (at least rhetorically)
as much as they do. 19 1 This analysis shows that belief in mediation
is primarily related to opinions about ADR, rather than criticism of
litigation. More generally, belief in mediation is largely related to
factors suggesting a desire to improve important relationships.
For ease of presentation, related variables are grouped together.
The first table includes demographic, organizational and professional
variables. The second table includes variables describing respondents' disputing experience. The third and fourth tables include variables reflecting respondents' opinions about the courts and ADR,
respectively. Most of the tables include variables with data from all
three types of respondents. However, several models exclude some
types of respondent because the variables are not appropriate or comparable for the different types of respondents. For example, measures of organization size are quite different for outside counsel
mediation. These differences were observed despite the fact that five of the six corporations had signed an ADR pledge sponsored by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. Id. at 5. For more information about the CPR pledge, see supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
191. Ideally, one would hope that a survey like this would provide strong evidence
about what "causes" people to believe in mediation. This study does provide evidence
that is quite suggestive, but it is not sufficient to support claims of causation. A basic
element for establishing causality is called "causal order." It is impossible to determine the causal order of the subjective measures given the cross-sectional research
design (i.e, where all the data were collected at a single point in time for each respondent). Even when causal order is not problematic, correlations in themselves do not
prove causation because the correlations may be "spurious." An association is spurious when the two associated (but actually independent) events are both caused by the
same prior cause. For example, there may a correlation between the volume of swimsuit sales and number of drowning deaths, but this would not prove that the sales
caused the deaths or vice versa; presumably they are both caused in part by the
amount of swimming associated with the swimming season. When there is not an
association between two variables, one can generally conclude that there is not a
causal relationship between them. For further discussion of causal inferences based
on this study, see Lande, Ideology of Disputing, supra note 95, at 59-64.
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(relating to law firms) and inside counsel and executives (relating to
their businesses). Similarly, different measures of amount of litigation experience were used for the attorneys and executives.
A.

Background Variables

Few of the background variables are significantly correlated with
belief in mediation (see Table 4). In particular, most of the demographic and organizational variables are not significantly correlated,
nor are most of the variables reflecting respondents' disputing experience. For example, belief in mediation is not related to age, status of
law school, length of career, tenure in one's current position, or tenure in one's profession. 192 There was a weak correlation between executives' belief in mediation and their political ideologies, with selfidentified liberals supporting mediation more than conservatives.
Belief in mediation is related to some aspects of respondents' experience with disputing, especially experience with ADR, though
there is no variable involving disputing experience that is related to
belief in mediation for more than one type of respondent (see Table
Table 4. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Personal and Organizational

Characteristics
Outside

Inside

Counsel

Counsel

Executives

Age

.08

.17

.02

Political conservatism

.00

.10

-.26*

Length of professional career

.01

.06

.00

Tenure with current firm

.01

-.01

-. 14

-

-.20

-.06

Number of attorneys in law firm

.07

-

-

Status of law school alma mater

.14

.09

-

Variable

Number of employees in firm

p < .05

192. These findings are at odds with a survey of Indiana attorneys in which
favorable views on a civil mediation scale are significantly correlated with age and
being in a group practice. Younger lawyers and those in group practice generally
have more favorable views of mediation than older lawyers and those who practice
alone. See Medley & Schellenberg, supra note 119, at 193-95. For information on the
status of the attorneys' law school alma mater, see Land Ideology of Disputing,supra

note 95, at 75.
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5). The strongest relationships are between the amount of outside
counsers experience as neutrals and (even more so as) partisans in
ADR procedures. The greater the amount of ADR experience, the
greater their belief in mediation. 193 One might hypothesize that this
is connected to greater belief in mediation by respondents most often
in the role of (or representing) defendants, but these two variables
are significantly correlated only for inside counsel, not outside counsel or executives. Indeed, inside counsel whose firms are more often
defendants expressed less belief in mediation than inside counsel
whose firms are less often defendants. For executives, none of the
variables relating to disputing experience is related to belief in
mediation.
Table 5. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Experience with Litigation and
ADR
Outside

Counsel

Variable

Executives

Percentage of career in which at least half of time
was devoted to litigation

.03

.03

-

Percentage of time in prior 12 months devoted to
litigation

.22

.08

-

Number of cases as witness or juror

-

-

.27

Number of cases as party

-

-

.26

Number of cases as decision maker

-

-

-.04

-.04

-.28 *

-.11

Percentage of clients that are businesses

.22

-

Number of cases as neutral in ADR

.31l*

-.01

-.13

Number of cases as partisan in ADR

.43**

.09

.12

Percentage of cases as defendant

*

Inside
Counsel

p<.05

-

**p<.Ol

193. This finding is consistent with the survey of Indiana lawyers in which
favorable attitudes on a civil mediation scale are significantly correlated with amount
of mediation experience (apparently as a partisan). See Medley & Schellenberg, supra
note 119, at 194-95.
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Table 6. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Sources of Information about
ADR
Outside Counsel

Inside Counsel

Executives

Personal experience with ADR

.35"*

.18

.16

Colleagues in their fhm

.05

.12

.33*

Colleagues not in their firm

.13

.02

.26

-

.03

ADR providers

-.06

.10

.00

Professional school

Lawyers (executives only)

-.09

-.22

-.03

Continuing education

.05

-.04

.01

Professional publications

.07

.03

.04

Total amount of information
p <.05
** p <.01

.17

-.02

.22

Belief in mediation is generally not related to the amount of information about ADR that respondents have received overall, 194 or
from particular sources (see Table 6). The major exception is that
outside counsel's belief in mediation is significantly correlated to how
much information about ADR they obtained from personal experience. This is consistent with findings that outside counsel's belief in
mediation is significantly correlated with the number of cases in
which they participated in ADR. 19 5 In addition, executives' belief in
mediation is related to the amount of information that they received
from colleagues other than lawyers, especially colleagues in their own
firm. Overall, this suggests that simply the amount of information
received about ADR is not in itself critical in generating belief in
mediation.
B.

Opinions About Courts
In everyday conversation, business executives and lawyers often
frame their views about ADR by (often critical) reference to the
courts. The statistical analysis of the survey responses in this study,
194. To calculate the total amount of information received, I calculated an average
of responses to questions about how much information the respondents received from
various sources. See supra, Part IV.C.
195. Not surprisingly, the amount of information that outside counsel (and the
other respondents) reported receiving from personal experience is highly correlated to
the number of cases in which they participated in ADR, especially as partisans. The
only exception to this correlation is that the amount of information that executives
received from personal experience is not significantly correlated with the number of
cases in which they served as neutrals in ADR. This may be due to the fact that very
few of the executives in the survey had much experience as a neutral.

HeinOnline -- 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 200 2000

Spring 2000]

Getting the Faith

by contrast, indicates surprisingly little connection between the two
(see Table 7). There was no significant correlation between belief in
mediation and satisfaction with respondents' personal experiences
with litigation, either in terms of the results or process of litigation.
Nor are there significant correlations with overall assessments of
how well the court system has been working or specific aspects of the
courts that are often used to justify use of mediation, such as the time
and cost of litigation and uncertainty about the courts' abilities to
find the truth and produce fair results. Only two correlations are statistically significant, and even these are fairly weak. Both of these
correlations are only for outside counsel. These correlations are between belief in mediation and perceptions that (a) court decisions
generally are unpredictable in lawsuits by individuals against businesses, and (b) litigation would generally be a poor way to resolve
business disputes even if courts ran quickly and efficiently. It is
worth noting that this is not an instrumental critique of the economics of litigation, but rather a critique of the more fundamental nature
of litigation as a dispute resolution procedure. As a whole, these survey findings suggest that belief in mediation is not generally based on
criticisms of the courts. There are, however, some findings that belief
in mediation is related to favorable assessments of ADR relative to
the courts, as described infra in Parts VLC and VI.D.
C.

Opinions About ADR

The statistical analysis suggests that the major factors relating
to belief in mediation involve qualities of ADR itself rather than dissatisfaction with the courts. Both outside counsel and inside counsel
who are more satisfied with their experiences in ADR have greater
belief in mediation (see Table 8).196 Surprisingly, correlations for
these variables are not statistically significant for executives. For
lawyers, belief in mediation seems to be based directly on evaluations
of their ADR experiences rather than relative evaluations of their
ADR experiences compared with their litigation experiences generally. I calculated the differences between the ratings of litigation and
196. Some questions referred specifically to mediation and others referred to ADR
generally. See supra note 102. Thus, the difference in the referents in the questions
might affect the results. For example, expected consequences of greater mediation
use might be quite different than consequences of greater use of arbitration or ADR
generally, and might produce different statistical relationships with belief in mediation. There is no obvious pattern based on matching of referents in the questions.
Some but not all questions referring to ADR generally explain belief in mediation, and
some questions specifically referring to mediation do not explain belief in mediation.
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Table 7. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Opinions About Litigation
Outside
Counsel

Variable

Inside
Counsel

Executives

Satisfaction with resultsin personal experience with
litigation

.03

-.08

-.17

Satisfaction with process in personal experience with
litigation

.02

-.03

-.16

How well courts have been working in past 10 years

.02

-.11

.04

Existence of a litigation explosion in past 10 years

.07

.10

-.16

Frequent suits so frivolous that they should not have been
filed

.07

.06

-.03

Cases (in litigation) are often resolved at an appropriate cost

-.20

.02

-.12

Cases (in litigation) are often resolved within an appropriate
amount of time

-.21

.00

-.03

Court results are often fair

-.10

-.06

.13

Courts are a good means of finding truth

.03

-.16

.03

Juries often do a good job of determining liability

.03

.10

.03

-.01

.19

.24

.10

-.23

.11

Court decisions generally are predictable in suits by
individuals against businesses

-.25*

.21

-.06

Litigation would be poor way to resolve business disputes
even if courts ran quickly and efficiently

-.28*

-.05

-.24

How often business' top executives are satisfied with results
of lawsuits involving a business

-.03

-.14

-.27

Lawsuits involving business divert resources from more
productive activities

-.16

.00

.07

Courts consider needs of particular business communities

-.24

-.04

-.05

Juries often do a good job of assessing damages
Juries use a higher standard in judging businesses than
individuals

* p < .05
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ADR regarding both results and process 9 7 and correlated these differences with belief in mediation. As Table 8 shows, correlations
with the relative satisfaction for the attorneys were usually less than
(and in one case, equal to) the correlations with the absolute satisfaction ratings of ADR experiences. The results here suggest that satisfaction with ADR experiences-at least for attorneys-may lead to
generalized belief in mediation.
Table 8. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Satisfaction with ADR Experience
Variable

Outside
I Counsel

Inside
Counsel

Executives

Satisfaction with results in their experiences with
ADR

.38**

.28*

-.02

Satisfaction with results in their experiences with
ADR relative to resultsin theirexperiences with
litigation

.27*

.22

.24

Satisfaction with process in their experiences with
ADR

.33**

.32*

.05

Satisfaction with process in their experiences with
ADR relative to processin theirexperiences with
litigation

.24

.32*

.06

*p<.05

**p<.01

The pattern of relationships between belief in mediation and selfinterested motivations related to ADR use' 9 8 is unexpected (see Table 9). It is surprising that expected consequences relating to compensation, opportunities for advancement, and prestige are not
significantly related to belief in mediation. It is especially surprising
197. For a description of the calculation of these ADR ratings relative to litigation
ratings, see supra Part Il.
198. The survey did not include questions asking respondents about their ov
motivations regarding ADR use, as it would have been socially undesirable for many
respondents to acknowledge directly any self-interest in their attitude toward mediation, such as a belief that supporting or opposing mediation would increase their compensation. Although the questions that were included in the survey about expected
effects of increased ADR use do not expressly ask about motivations to propose or use
ADR, they are very suggestive about respondents' motivations. This is especially so
where there is no significant relationship between expected consequences and belief
in mediation. For example, if the expected effect on personal compensation does not
predict belief in greater use of mediation, it seems implausible that people would be
motivated to support (or oppose) mediation use because they want to earn more. This
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because material self-interest has been suggested as an important
factor why people would or would not support greater ADR use. 19 9
Lawyers and business executives are widely perceived to be especially materially self-interested. Lawyers-particularly private attorneys-are often seen as parasites and predators, 20 0 and a fear of loss
of income resulting from use of ADR is sometimes suggested as a reason why they might oppose its use.2 0 1 Business executives are often
seen as greedy, and given the perception that litigation is expensive
and reduces corporate profits (which in turn might affect personal
compensation packages for many executives), one might expect that
executives would be strongly in favor of mediation. However, this
study finds that respondents' expectations about effects on compensation, personal advancement, prestige, professional autonomy, and opportunities to do satisfying work are not related to their support of
mediation.
Table 9. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Expected Personal Consequences
of Increased ADR Use

Variable

Outside
Counsel

Inside
Counsel

Executives

Increased compensation

-. 22

.14

-.06

Increased opportunities for advancement

-.12

.13

-.07

Increased relative importance within their firm

.04

.13

.07

Increased ability to work independent of direction of

.11

.23

.28

.16

.25

.17

colleagues in other professions
Increased ability to do work they find very satisfying

Some general beliefs about ADR are significantly related to belief
in mediation (see Table 10). Consistent with repeated findings in the
sociology of law literature about the significance of maintaining good

inference is especially compelling given that large segments of the sample do not believe that greater ADR use would have any effect on them personally. See supra Part
V.C.
199.
200.
201.

See supra Part II.B.
See generally Galanter, supra note 91.
As described in Part V.C, supra, these perceptions are often erroneous.
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long-term relations in business relationships, 20 2 this study indicates
that, for all three types of respondents, belief in mediation is significantly related to beliefs that mediation helps preserve business relationships. In addition, for all three types of respondents, belief in
mediation is related to perceptions that mediation results satisfy corporate executives. For inside counsel and executives, the correlation
is even stronger for perception of top executives' satisfaction with mediation results relative to litigation where mediation is not used.
These are among the strongest correlations with belief in mediation
found in this study. As noted above, the respondents' perceptions
about top executives' satisfaction with mediation results seem to be
indicative of respondents' sensitivity to intra-organizational
20 3
relationships.
There are several other opinions about ADR that are correlated
with belief in mediation, almost all correlated for outside counsel
only. Many of these correlations are with variables involving ratings
of ADR relative to litigation.2 04 For outside counsel, there is a significant correlation between belief in mediation and perceptions that
mediators and arbitrators generally consider the needs and practices
of particular business communities. The correlation of belief in mediation is larger and more significant with the outside counsel's views
of consideration of business needs and practices by mediators and arbitrators relative to the legal system generally. Interestingly, belief in
mediation is not directly correlated to assessments of how often cases
are resolved within an appropriate amount of time or for an appropriate amount of money in suits where mediation is used, but there are
significant correlations with the ratings relative to suits where mediation is not used. But for outside counsel, belief in mediation transcends time and cost savings. One of the largest correlations is with
the premise that businesses would be worse off using the courts even
if ADR takes as much time and money as the courts. 20 5 In sum,

202. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 57, at 62-65; Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change:The Semi-Autonomous Social Fieldas an AppropriateSubject of Study, 7
L. & Socdy Rav. 719, 720-29 (1973).
203. See Part V.G.
204. For a description of how relative ratings were calculated, see supra Part III.
205. Respondents were asked to give ratings of agreement or disagreement with
the statement "IfADR procedures take as much time and money as the courts, businesses generally would be better off using the courts to resolve their disputes." To
provide ratings in which higher values reflected positive attitudes about ADR, the
coding was "reversed" by subtracting the respondents' ratings from ten. In Table 10,
the wording for this item was changed for greater clarity.
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Table 10. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Specific Opinions About
Mediation
Variable

Outside
Counsel

Inside
Counsel

Executives

Mediation helps preserve business relationships

.37**

.36**

.35*

Business' top executives are often satisfied with the
results in lawsuits where mediation is used

.40**

.33*

.38*

Business' top executives are often satisfied with the
results in suits where mediation is used relative to suits

.37**

.43**

.44**

Mediators and arbitrators generally consider needs and
practices of particular business communities

.24*

.12

.01

Mediators and arbitrators generally consider needs and
practices of particular business communities relative to

.34**

.15

.03

Cases are often resolved within an appropriate amount of
time in lawsuits where mediation is used

.18

.21

-.03

Cases are often resolved within an appropriate amount of
time in suits where mediation is used relative to lawsuits

.37**

.19

.05

Cases are often resolved at an appropriate cost in suits
where mediation is used

.15

.23

.01

Cases are often resolved at an appropriate cost in suits

.32*

.20

.17

Businesses would be worse off using the courts even if
ADR takes as much time and money as the courts

.39**

.20

.26

Knowledge about mediation procedures is more
specialized skill and learning than common sense

-. 12

.06

-.33*

Often appropriate to reach settlement involving outcomes
other than or in addition to monetary payments

-.06

.23

.11

.02

.06

.06

where mediation is not used

the legal system generally

generally

where mediation is used relative to lawsuits generally

Often appropriate for businesses to try to find outcomes
addressing parties' underlying interests
*p<.05

**p<.01
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outside counsel's belief in mediation is related to both economic and
20 6
non-economic factors.
For inside counsel and executives, there are fewer opinions about
ADR that are correlated with belief in mediation. Inside counsel's
belief in mediation is significantly correlated only with the view that
mediation helps preserve relationships. For executives, in addition to
that correlation, belief in mediation is significantly correlated with
the view that mediation is more a matter of common sense than specialized skill and knowledge. Executives generally find legal disputes
to be confusing and distasteful. 20 7 Thus, it seems plausible that their
belief in a disputing procedure might be related to a perception that
the procedure simplifies the dispute rather than making it even more
complex.
D. Perceptionsof Leaders' Opinions About ADR
Respondents' perceptions of whether their organizational superiors208 have favorable or unfavorable opinions about ADR are significantly correlated to respondents' belief in mediation, at least for the
attorneys (see Table 11). This factor is not quite significantly related
to belief in mediation for the executives. The correlations are similar
for variables reflecting respondents' perceptions of organizational
superiors' opinions about ADR relative to how well the court system
has been working in the past 10 years. This factor is subject to several complementary interpretations. On one hand, agreeing with
one's bosses is a time-honored method of promoting one's self-interests. On the other hand, sharing beliefs with one's superiors is a
form of symbolic action of organizational commitment that may not
206. Multiple regression analyses of these variables' relationships with belief in
mediation by outside counsel indicate that some variables are more directly related to
belief in mediation than others. Variables that are more directly related to outside
counsel's belief in mediation include opinions about whether mediation helps promote
business relationships, whether mediators and arbitrators are more sensitive to businesses' needs and practices than the courts, and how often cases are resolved within
an appropriate amount of time relative to the courts. Other variables are significantly correlated with outside counsel's belief in mediation when considered individually but are not significant when considered together with related variables,
suggesting that the relationships are less direct between these variables and outside
counsers belief in mediation. These variables include opinions about whether businesses would be worse off using the courts even if ADR takes as much time and money
as the courts and how often cases are resolved at an appropriate cost relative to the
courts.
207. See Lande, FailingFaith,supra note 95, at 51-52.
208. For definition of "organizational superior as used in this study, see supra
Part IVA. As indicated in Part IV.A, some, but not all, of the organizational superiors are "top executives" referred to in a question analyzed in Part VI.C.
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be conscious or intentional and may be loosely linked (if at all) with
20 9
influence efforts in contests for resources.
Table 11. Correlations Between Belief in Mediation and Perceived Opinions of
Organizational and Professional Leaders
Variable

Outside
Counsel

Inside
Counsel

Executives

Organizational superiors have favorable opinions
about ADR

.28*

.32*

.27

Organizational superiors have favorable opinions
about ADR relative to court system

.22

.39*

.26

Professional leaders have favorable opinions about
ADR

.16

.19

.34*

Professional leaders have favorable opinions about
ADR relative to court system

-.01

.21

.34*

Respondent's firm has policy to consider using ADR
in its disputes

-.06

-.07

-.06

Respondent's firm has policy to consider using ADR
clauses in its contracts

.03

-.02

-.14

*p < .05

The existence of organizational policies about use of ADR in contracts or actual disputes (at least to the extent that respondents were
aware of them) is not significantly correlated with belief in mediation
(or even perceived opinions of organizational superiors). This suggests that adoption of such policies may be symbolic action without
2 10
direct substantive actions or effects.
Perceived opinions of leaders in respondents' professions about
ADR are not generally correlated with respondents' own beliefs in
mediation. There is a significant correlation for executives, which is
the same both directly and in relation to the perceived opinions of

209. See Pfeffer, supra note 67, at 34-38 (discussing the consequences of symbolic
action). For an illustration of one respondent's observation of the lack of connection
between adoption of ADR pledges and perception of organizational leaders' actual
opinions, see supra text accompanying note 190.
210. See generally Meyer & Rowan, supra note 61.
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professional leaders about ADR relative to their opinions about how
2 11
well the court system has been working.
Overall, the findings in this Part suggest that respondents have
a keen sensitivity to the apparent views of their organizational and
professional leaders and that respondents' own views are significantly related to the perceived views of their leaders. Organizational
policies promoting ADR use, however, do not seem to be related to
respondents' belief in mediation.
VII.

SUmIAsiRY: SIm.ERrs AND DIFFERENCES IN OPINIONS ABOUT

ADR BETWEEN THE TmEE TYPES OF RESPONDENTS
The three types of respondents have generally similar patterns of
belief about mediation, though with some important differences. Certainly, there is much greater congruence of views about ADR by the
three types of respondents than about litigation, regarding which
their views differ sharply. 2 ' 2 Indeed, many of the differences between the three types of respondents involve relative assessments of
ADR as compared with litigation in which ADR is not used.
Much of the information that all three types of respondents have
about ADR came from their own personal experience. In addition,
substantial percentages of all three types of respondents said that
they received "more than a little" information about ADR from attorneys. Substantial percentages of the outside counsel and inside counsel also said that they received more than a little information about
ADR from ADR providers, professional publications, and continuing
education programs; much smaller percentages of executives gave
similar responses.
All three types of respondents generally do believe in mediation.
The overwhelming majority of each group believes that mediation is
appropriate in at least half of lawsuits involving a business.
Although these findings indicate that outside counsel generally believe in mediation somewhat more than executives, this is largely a
function of most outside counsel believing that mediation is appropriate in more than halfthe cases, whereas a larger percentage of executives believe that mediation is appropriate in about half of cases.
211. In multiple regression analyses that include several variables correlated with
belief in mediation, executives' perceived opinions of professional leaders about ADR
(both directly and relative to the court system) are not significantly related to belief in
mediation. This suggests that the relationship between professional leaders' opinions
and respondents' own opinions is somewhat indirect.
212. See Lande, FailingFaith, supra note 95, at 48-54.
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While it is important to try to understand what accounts for this difference (as described in this article), this analysis should not obscure
the overall similarity in respondents' belief in mediation. Indeed,
there are relatively few significant differences between the three
types of respondents regarding many specific opinions about mediation and ADR generally.
About three-quarters of all three types of respondents report satisfaction with their ADR experiences, both in terms of the process
and results. Majorities of all three types of respondents believe that
increased use of ADR by their firms or major clients probably would
not affect them in terms of compensation, prestige, advancement,
professional autonomy, or satisfaction with their work, with a few exceptions. Of those who do expect such consequences, substantial proportions believe that the changes would be positive. The most
notable differences between types of respondents is that substantially
greater proportions of inside counsel than outside counsel or executives believe that increased ADR use would improve their situations,
particularly regarding prestige within their firms and opportunities
to do satisfying work. Executives see ADR as providing significantly
greater opportunities for autonomy from their lawyers than the lawyers see it as providing autonomy from their clients.
Most respondents have favorable beliefs about use of mediation
in business disputes. About three-quarters of respondents believe
that at least half of mediated cases are resolved in an appropriate
time and at an appropriate cost. Over three-quarters believe that
mediation helps preserve business relationships and two-thirds believe that mediators and arbitrators generally consider the needs and
practices of particular business communities. There is a significant
difference between types of respondents about whether businesses
generally would be better off using the courts to resolve their disputes
if ADR procedures took as much time and money as the courts. Pluralities of executives and inside counsel believe that businesses
would be better off using the courts under those circumstances, compared with a majority of outside counsel who believe that ADR would
still be preferable (though most do not believe that mediation does
take as much time and money as the courts). The vast majority of all
types of respondents believe that it is usually appropriate for businesses to try to find outcomes addressing the underlying interests of
each party rather than seeking the largest possible concessions,
though outside counsel said that it is appropriate to seek to meet underlying interests in more cases than executives did. The vast majority of all three types of respondents also said that in at least half of
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business suits, it is appropriate to reach a settlement involving outcomes other than, or in addition to, monetary payments.
The overwhelming majority of respondents believe that top corporate executives are satisfied with the results of mediation in at
least half of the cases. Overall, each type of respondent believes that
their organizational superiors and the leaders of their professions
have favorable views about ADR. Outside counsel believe that leaders in their profession have more favorable opinions about ADR than
do the inside counsel and executives.
Although the three types of respondents have fairly similar
views about mediation and ADR generally, there are more differences
in the patterns of factors that are (and are not) related to belief in
mediation. For all three types of respondents, most of the variables
are not significantly correlated with belief in mediation. These include most factors relating to the respondents' personal backgrounds,
litigation and ADR experience, opinions about litigation, amount of
information about ADR received from various sources, expected personal consequences of increased ADR use, and the existence of policies in their firms to promote use of ADR.
There are two variables that are significantly correlated with belief in mediation for all three types of respondents. These are beliefs
that mediation helps preserve business relationships and that business' top executives are often satisfied with the results of lawsuits
where mediation is used. 2 13 In addition, for both outside counsel and
inside counsel-but not executives-belief in mediation is significantly correlated with satisfaction with the process and results of
their ADR experiences as well as perceptions about whether their or2 14
ganizational superiors have favorable opinions about ADR.
For outside counsel, belief in mediation is significantly correlated
with quite a number of additional factors. These include amount of
experience with ADR, both as a neutral and a partisan, as well as
perceptions that: (1) court decisions are unpredictable, (2) litigation is
a poor way to resolve disputes even if courts run quickly and efficiently, (3) businesses would be worse off using courts even if ADR
213. A third variable is also significantly correlated with belief in mediation for all
three types of respondents, but it is essentially derivative of one of the other two variables. This third variable is an estimate of how often top executives are satisfied with
results of mediation relative to an estimate of top executive satisfaction with litigation where mediation is not used.
214. Perceived favorable views about ADR by organizational superiors relative to
their views about the court system is also significantly correlated with inside counsers belief in mediation.
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takes as much time and money as the courts, (4) ADR neutrals generally consider business needs and practices (particularly so as compared with the courts), and (5) cases in mediation are resolved within
an appropriate amount of time and at an appropriate cost.
Performing a statistical multiple regression analysis using all
the variables that are significantly correlated with belief in mediation
for outside counsel 2 15 produces a model that explains a substantial
48% of the variance. 2 16 This model indicates that the variables that
are most directly related to belief in mediation are: the belief that
mediation helps preserve business relationships, the belief that litigation is a poor way to resolve disputes even if courts run quickly and
efficiently, and the amount of ADR experience as a partisan. Thus,
although economic factors such as perceived time and expense advantages of mediation are somewhat related to outside counsel's belief in
mediation, this analysis suggests that qualitative factors such as the
effect on business relationships and the nature of the litigation process are more directly related to outside counsel's belief in mediation.
In addition, simply having more experience with ADR seems to lead
to greater belief in mediation by outside counsel.
For inside counsel, belief in mediation is significantly correlated
with their firms' more frequent status as plaintiffs in litigation, in
addition to the variables mentioned above. 2 17 A multiple regression
analysis using all the variables that are significantly correlated with
belief in mediation for inside counsel 218 produces a model that explains 37% of the variance. The variables that are most directly related to belief in mediation by inside counsel are that top executives
215. The regression analysis did not include several "relative" variables, as this
would cause inappropriate duplication and possible problems of multicollinearity.
For discussion of multicollinearity, see NEWR Err AL., supra note 100, at 687-92. The
"relative" variables were constructed by subtracting a rating of a quality of litigation
from the rating of the same quality in litigation where mediation or ADR is used. See
supra, Part III. The "relative" factors excluded from the regression analysis involve
satisfaction with the process and results of disputing experience, sensitivity to business needs and interests, and perceived satisfaction of top executives with dispute
results.
216. This percentage of explained variance is the "adjusted R2," which takes into
account the number of variables in the model and is thus a more conservative measure than the unadjusted R2. See NE=ER ET AL., supra note 100, at 663-64.
217. For other factors significantly correlated with inside counsel's belief in mediation, see supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
218. The regression analysis generally did not include factors relative to comparable variables about litigation where the analysis included the factor without reference
to the comparable variable about litigation. See supra Part III for description of ratings of ADR relative to litigation. The model did include perceived satisfaction of top
business executives with mediation results relative to litigation in place of the direct
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are more satisfied with the results of mediation than litigation and
that inside counsel's organizational superiors have favorable opinions
about ADR. This suggests that inside counsel's belief in mediation
most directly reflects an identification with their superiors' views
about ADR and litigation.
Executives' belief in mediation is significantly correlated with
having a liberal political philosophy, the amount of information about
ADR received from colleagues in their firm other than lawyers, perception that knowledge about mediation is more a matter of common
sense than specialized skill and learning, and a perception that leaders in their profession have favorable views about ADR, in addition to
the variables previously mentioned. 2 19 A multiple regression analysis of all the variables significantly correlated with belief in mediation for executives 220 produces a model that explains 23% of the
variance. The only factor in that model that is directly related to executives' belief in mediation in that analysis is the perception that
top executives are more satisfied with the results of mediation than
litigation. The perception that executives are satisfied with the results of mediation could reflect an interest in bottom-line results, attentiveness to authorities' desires, or both. It is noteworthy that
most of the factors that are correlated with executives' belief in mediation do not relate particularly to dispute processing, but rather involve more general opinions and links to others in their networks.
Consideration of these patterns in conjunction with executives' acid
views about litigation 2 21 suggests that executives' belief in mediation
may be a function, at least in part, of their desire to avoid the
problems that they generally experience with litigation.

measure of perceived satisfaction with mediation results, because the correlation with
the relative measure is stronger than with the direct measure.
219. For other factors significantly correlated with executives' belief in mediation,
see text accompanying note 213, supra.
220. The regression analysis did not include factors relative to comparable variables about litigation where the analysis included the factor without reference to the
comparable variable about litigation. See supra Part I for description of ratings of
ADR relative to litigation. The model did include perceived satisfaction of top busi-

ness executives with mediation results relative to litigation in place of the direct measure of perceived satisfaction with mediation results, because the correlation with the

relative measure is stronger than with the direct measure.
221. See Lande, FailingFaith,supra note 95, at 51-52.
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IMPLICATIONS ABOUT PROMOTING INCREASED USE
OF MEDIATION

Part VIII.A uses the sociological theories presented in Part II.B
to analyze why lawyers and executives believe in mediation. Part
VIII.B describes strategies that proponents might use (or continue
using) to promote increased use of mediation based on the analysis in
this article. 2 22 Part VIII.C discusses some cautions in developing
strategies for promoting mediation use.
A.

Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation

The sociological theory of institutionalism 223 helps explain the
findings of this study about why business lawyers and executives believe in mediation. Perceptions that mediation helps preserve business relationships and that top corporate executives like mediation
results are among the strongest correlates of belief in mediation, and
these are the only ones that are significant for all three types of respondents in this study. This suggests that the process of coming to
believe in mediation involves a process of conformity with the views
of authority. Moreover, this belief becomes increasingly taken for
granted rather than consistently being based on individualized calculation of the expected consequences of using mediation.
This is not to say that such calculation does not occur or is not
related to belief in mediation. The qualitative interviews, especially
with the attorneys, included numerous references to choosing mediation or other ADR procedures based on expected time and cost savings, among other considerations. In most legal disputes, the parties
and attorneys presumably do make at least rough guesses about the
consequences that are likely if they use mediation or not. The survey
data indicate that for outside counsel, belief in mediation is significantly correlated with perceived time and cost advantages of mediation compared with litigation. For both inside counsel and outside
counsel, belief in mediation is also strongly correlated with their level
of satisfaction with their own experiences with ADR. Moreover, it is
certainly rational for parties and attorneys to consider potential effects on key relationships described in this study in assessing appropriateness of mediation. This is all consistent with institutional
222. These strategies are not strictly limited to the research findings. For example, it makes sense to structure mediation in such a way as to satisfy business executives, even though belief in mediation is significantly correlated with satisfaction for
both types of attorneys but not the executives as well.
223.

See supra Part II.B.
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theory suggesting that consideration of technical characteristics of an
innovation plays a particularly
important role in early stages of
24
institutionalization.2

This study indicates that these individualized, experience-based
calculations are not the only-or probably even the most-important
factors in developing belief in mediation. The focus on preserving relationships, general satisfaction of top corporate executives, and significant correlation with perceived opinions of organizational and
professional leaders all suggest that business lawyers' and executives' belief in mediation is institutionalized. Over time, lawyers and
executives develop generalized opinions, typically that mediation is
good and should be used, or at least considered, regularly.2
These
general opinions are supported, and perhaps generated, by perceptions that choosing mediation promotes legitimacy in the eyes of organizational and professional leaders and perhaps judges and
court
administrators as well.2 26 Some judges are among the biggest fans of
mediation 22 7 and routinely order parties to use mediation in their
courts. Even when a statute allows for a case-by-case assessment of
appropriateness, such as in Florida, there are judges who refer all

224. See supra Part H.B.
225. McEwen observed similar, institutionalized, "taken-for-granted" beliefs about
disputing in comparing one corporation that developed a systematic approach to using
ADR with corporations that used it on a case-by-case basis, if at all:
MTihe greatest threats to the effective use of mediation to produce higher
quality, more timely, and cost efficient resolution of disputes come not from
an "adversarial culture" but from the fact that frequently lawyers and their
clients are trapped by the routines, incentives, and traditional expectations
of legal and business practice. What frees lawyers and clients from these
routines and their accompanying expectations is not the use of mediation
processes alone. Rather it is new ways of thinking systematically about disputes that are made possible by taking on new roles as managers of disputing with clear objectives to manage toward and by self-consciously accepting
mediation principles as the default framework for assessing conflicts.
McEwen, supra note 119, at 25-26.
Presumably after a period of self-conscious innovation, mediation principles have
or will become the new taken-for-granted institution of disputing in that corporation.
See generallyAnn Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 A=L Soc.
Rv. 273 (1986).
226. The fact that mediation referrals are authorized by statute in states like Florida and Massachusetts, see generally ROGERS & McEwN, supra note 20, at §6:04,
endows mediation with significant legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell use the term "coercive isomorphism," referring to modeling based on government rules or practices.
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 59, at 150-51.
227. See e.g., Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findingsand
Proposals,26 U.S.F. L. REv. 343, 365-66 (1992).
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their cases to mediation and do a review only if requested by the parties. 228 Indeed, in some places, the use of mediation has become so
routine and accepted that lawyers do not wait to be ordered into me22 9
diation but initiate it themselves.
Observations and accounts of the process of "getting the faith" in
mediation also support the explanation of an institutionalization process. There seems to be a general pattern in which attorneys initially
resist new mediation programs, and then, in relatively short order,
become some of the biggest proponents for mediation use.23 0 Indeed,
it has become something of a ritual at continuing legal education programs for "converts" to mediation to give testimonials about how they
initially balked at using mediation, but how they are now satisfied
believers who use it as often as possible and appropriate. 23 1 Clearly,
these "conversions" are based on experience, which presumably provides opportunities for comparison of litigation with and without mediation. However, the sharp shifts in avowed belief from skeptic to
228. Email from Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute Resolution Center (Sept.
7, 1999) (on file with author).
229. In Hennepin County (Minnesota), lawyers view Supreme Court Rule 114 as
mandating use of ADR, usually mediation. A preliminary study based on 12 in-depth
interviews with Hennepin County lawyers found that as a result of Rule 114, "[tlhere
may be less lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation" as lawyers prefer to "wait for a 'mandatory'
mediator's assistance with settlement." Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, The Times
They Are a Changin'--OrAre They? An Update on Rule 114, HENNEPIN LAW, JulyAug. 1996, at 8.
230. See, e.g., McEwen et al., supra note 87, at 177 (quoting an attorney, "When
we first began mediating, I think there was a lot of resistance. ... But I do think that
over time we've all become acclimated to it."); Leonard Edwards, Dependency Court
Mediation:The Role of the Judge, 35 FAM.& CONCIIATION CTs. REV. 160, 160 (1997)
(anticipating regular resistance to new dependency mediation programs),
231. I recently observed two experiences of such testimonials at professional continning education programs: Edwin L. Lowther, Jr., To Prepare for Mediation is to
Prepare for Trial, Remarks at the meeting of the Arkansas Bar Association (June 11,
1999) (a defense attorney described his change in approach from using mediation only
when clients insisted to using it whenever it is appropriate); Michael R. Mayton, Remarks at the Panel Discussion on Mediation at the 13th Annual Workers' Compensation Educational Conference of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission
(Aug. 26, 1999) (a self-described former skeptic stated that he is now "an advocate" for
mediation).
This study highlights the important role that attorneys play as disseminators of
information about ADR. All three types of respondents indicated that attorneys are
important sources of information for them, especially for the executives. For the attorneys, professional information channels such as professional publications and continuing education programs are also important sources of information. Although this
study did not find that belief in mediation is significantly correlated with the amount
of information about ADR that respondents received, I suspect that repeated
messages through professional communication channels play an important part in
the institutionalization process, as suggested by institutional theory.
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strong proponent suggest that the conversions are more a function of
a change in perceived legitimacy of dispute resolution procedures
than careful calculation of advantages and disadvantages. Obviously, the purpose of such public testimonials at professional gatherings is to legitimize mediation in order that others may make similar
conversions in belief and practice.
Over time, repeated exposure to public and private testimonials,
as well as the mediation process itself, transforms mediation from an
innovation into a routine part of the disputing practice that becomes
taken for granted as the (currently) normal way of doing things. After the mediation innovation has become institutionalized for a time,
it becomes difficult to conceive of alternative arrangements, and even
those who initially resisted the innovation are likely to resist chang23 2
ing a new status quo.
Also consistent with institutional theory, but contrary to several
theories of the professions, this study suggests that belief in mediation is not related to perceived self-interest of key professionals. All
three types of respondents generally believe in mediation and do not
believe that increased ADR use would affect them much; moreover,
belief in mediation is not significantly correlated with any of the five
types of professional interest measured in this study. This suggests
that belief in mediation is more related to attorneys' and executives'
definitions of their appropriate roles and functions than calculations
of their own self-interest.
Contrary to both institutional theory and theories of the professions, business lawyers and executives generally do not believe that
mediation involves a high degree of specialized skill and knowledge,
and belief in mediation was not correlated with perceptions of mediation as involving such specialized knowledge. For the executives, this
might be readily explained as a reaction against perceptions of excessive specialization and mystification of litigation. This explanation
could also fit for the attorneys, who may also be frustrated with litigation, though this explanation does not fit as well for the generally
experienced attorneys in this study who presumably have become
comfortable with litigation.
232. This seems like an inevitable part of institutionalization of innovations. After innovations become routine, it is hard to imagine how people lived without them

(e.g., indoor plumbing, telephones, TV, faxes, email, etc.) or going back to the days
before the innovation became institutionalized. I have seen this process in the Mediation Program that I direct at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
After operating for about 18 months, some people who initially resisted using media-

tion have "warmed up" to it and accepted it as part of their regular practice, sometimes even requesting it themselves.
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B. Strategies for Mediation Proponents
Certainly, just believing in mediation is not sufficient to increase
mediation use. For one thing, decisions to use mediation generally
require agreement of a number of people. In contractual mediation
(i.e., without court order) many of the people who will decide whether
to use mediation may be angry at each other or perceive that they
have conflicting interests about using mediation. Court-ordered mediation requires agreement of policymakers and officials to institute
and implement a program faithfully. In addition, individuals may be
ambivalent, believing in mediation in theory but being reluctant to
use it in practice. Respondents described the familiar "not in my
case" reaction of ostensible mediation believers when presented with
opportunities to mediate their cases. 2 33 Nonetheless, I do believe
that having favorable opinions about mediation is probably an important (though obviously not determinative) factor in decisions to actually use it.234
Starting on a behavioral level, this study suggests that providing
lawyers with experience with mediation should be an effective strategy to promote belief in mediation. This is the "try-it, you'll-like-it"
rationale of statutes that authorize courts to order cases to mediation.2 35 These programs force attorneys and parties to overcome inexperience with mediation and resistance to change. This is
especially salient for attorneys who may regularly have cases to mediate. This study suggests that repeated experience of parties-and
especially attorneys-with mediation may be a successful strategy in
promoting increased use of mediation, at least in the short term.23 6
233. See text accompanying note 125, supra (containing an attorney's description
of a situation where clients who say that they favor ADR decline to use it in specific
cases); text accompanying note 190, supra (describing an attorney's observation that
top executives sometimes sign a pledge to use ADR, but are unwilling to use it in their
own disputes).
234. This relates to an issue in social psychology about the relationship between
attitudes and behavior and whether a favorable attitude is necessary to change behavior. In some situations, changes in attitudes may occur only after changes in behavior. For example, racial attitudes may change only after people experience a nondiscrimination regime for an extended time. See Robert B. Seidman, JustifyingLegislation:A Pragmatic,InstitutionalistApproach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative
Theory, and PracticalReason, 29 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 47-48 (1992). Thus, I do not
suggest that a favorable mediation ideology is absolutely necessary to change behavior regarding mediation use, but it may be an important factor in some situations.
235. See ROGERS & McEWEN,supra note 20, at §6:04.
236. It is worth noting that the correlation between amount of experience with
ADR and belief in mediation is statistically significant only for the outside counsel.
This may be because this group has had the most experience with ADR and thus the
most exposure to the institutionalization process. If inside counsel and executives
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When parties-and especially attorneys-use mediation, it is important that they be satisfied with the results and process. Not surprisingly, many factors associated with satisfaction 23 7 are the same
as those correlated with belief in mediation. Many of these factors
involve improving or building key relationships. 2 38 For example, for
all three types of respondents, satisfaction is highly correlated with
beliefs that mediation helps preserve business relationships, that
mediators and arbitrators generally consider the needs and practices
of particular business communities, that business' top executives are
often satisfied with the results of mediation, and that businesses generally would be worse off using the courts to resolve their disputes
even if ADR procedures took as much time and money as the
courts. 23 9 Economic factors are also quite significantly correlated
with satisfaction for the attorneys, especially the inside counsel. This
includes perceptions that suits in mediation are often resolved at an
appropriate cost and especially that they are resolved within an appropriate amount of time. For executives, these time and cost considerations are not quite significantly correlated with satisfaction,
though the correlation with perceived appropriateness of cost is considerable. Relational factors are related to belief in mediation both
indirectly-as factors related to satisfaction with ADR experience
(which is in turn related to belief in mediation for both types of attorneys)-as well as directly as ideological factors in their own right. In
sum, mediators and mediation program administrators intent on expanding their market are (not surprisingly) well advised to focus on
have increased experience with mediation, it seems plausible that their belief in mediation would increase as well. For some cautions about a strategy of mandating mediation, see infra Part VIII.C.
237. In the following discussion, for convenience, "satisfaction7 refers to satisfaction with both the process and results of mediation.
238. This is somewhat similar to the findings of McEwen and his colleagues, who
found that attorneys in Maine came to support divorce mediation because it helped
them manage their relationships with their clients and opposing parties, and, indeed,
to manage their practices generally. They found that divorce mediation helped attorneys reconcile the following dilemmas:
[Hlow to pursue both negotiation and trial preparation; how to encourage
client participation in case preparation while retaining one's professional authority;, how to provide clients with legal advice while addressing vitally important non-legal issues; and how to structure and manage cases so that they
can be moved predictably and expeditiously.
McEwen et al., supra note 87, at 150.
239. For executives, some of these correlations are somewhat substantial (r = .25
or more), but not quite statistically significant because of small sample sizes. Questions about satisfaction with ADR experience were asked only of respondents who
said that they had any personal experience with ADR, which was true for only 25 of
the 60 executives.

HeinOnline -- 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 219 2000

220

HarvardNegotiation Law Review

[Vol. 5:137

satisfying their customers, which entails providing an efficient and
timely dispute resolution service and being especially attentive to the
relational needs of the participants, particularly top executives in
business disputes.
This research also highlights an interesting set of interactions
that may be important for promoting mediation. This study shows
that attorneys are key sources of information about ADR for colleagues and clients alike. It also indicates that both outside counsel
and inside counsel are generally very sensitive to the perceptions and
desires of their clients and superiors regarding dispute resolution.
Thus, there may be cyclical exchanges in which attorneys provide information and superiors provide values and direction about handling
disputes. Given the significance of the findings regarding concern for
superiors' and top executives' opinions as factors related to belief in
mediation, increasing consultation about use of dispute resolution
procedures could promote belief in (and thus perhaps use of) mediation. Some business firms and law firms have signed pledges that
2 40
their firms will consider using ADR for handling their disputes.
The existence of these policies is not significantly correlated with belief that organizational superiors have favorable opinions about ADR
for any of the three types of respondents. 24 1 Depending on how these
pledge policies are implemented, they may not stimulate routine consultation between attorneys and clients about using mediation or
other forms of ADR in particular disputes. It seems plausible that
such routine consultation about dispute resolution procedures would
increase superiors' awareness of the mediation option and increase
attorneys' sensitivity to the superiors' concerns and ways that mediation might address those concerns.2 4 2 Laws and professional responsibility rules mandating that attorneys routinely discuss ADR
240. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
241. In these cynical times, the existence of such organizational pledges may be
seen as symbolic substitutes for concrete actions for some firms and executives that
want to appear legitimate by "jumping on the ADR bandwagon" but who are not (perceived to be) true believers. See generally Pfeffer, supra note 67; Meyer & Rowan,
supra note 61. The significant correlations to perceived actual beliefs of superiors and
executives suggest that business lawyers and executives may be especially tuned into
what they believe are the actual beliefs and are not "taken in" by "mere" symbolic
actions.
242. This study clearly finds that attorneys' sensitivity to executives' concerns and
the belief that mediation addresses executives' concerns are related to the attorneys'
belief in mediation. It does not, however, find that the amount of information that
executives get from attorneys is related to the level of the executives' belief in mediation. Such a connection would provide evidence of a mutually reinforcing cycle in
which attorneys' provision of information and executives' expression of concerns

HeinOnline -- 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 220 2000

Spring 2000]

Getting the Faith

221

options with clients may also contribute to increased belief in and use
of mediation. 2 43
This study suggests that arguments simply or primarily appealing to the direct self-interest of attorneys and executives would not
seem to be effective in instilling belief in mediation or increasing
their use of mediation. This is somewhat surprising both because
people are often believed to operate on self-interest and because
many lawyers, in particular, are often perceived initially to resist introduction of mediation out of fear of loss of income. The lack of significant correlations between belief in mediation and the variables
involving professional self-interest may be due to the fact that most
respondents said that they did not expect much effect from increased
ADR use. If they believed that they had more to gain or lose, there
might be a significant connection between the two.
One might cautiously extend these findings beyond the intra-organizational context of business disputes. In many jurisdictions,
mediators and others want to build a market for mediation of legal
disputes and/or a court-annexed mediation program. The findings in
this study suggest that for these efforts to generate belief in mediation by the rank-and-file professionals who serve as case gatekeepers
and dispute handlers, it may be important to gain support from authorities comparable to top business executives. In court, judges are
the preeminent authorities. If influential judges are seen as supporting the market or program, then lawyers, court administrators, and
others necessary for smooth functioning of litigation are likely to believe in them too.24 4
Mediation promoters often have a good intuitive understanding
of the importance of enlisting the support of judges, lawyers, and
other key professionals. For example, the Arkansas General Assembly recently passed a law authorizing courts to order parties to mediate cases involving "parenting issues"2A5 and the Arkansas Conflict
would increase both sides'belief in mediation. Nonetheless, even a one-way transmission from executives to attorneys may contribute to an institutionalization of mediation, if done on a regular basis.
243. A number of states have adopted rules requiring attorneys to discuss ADR
options with clients, either as rules of civil procedure or professional responsibility.
See ROGERS & McEwFN, supra note 20, at §4:03. Discussion of the policy merits of
such rules is beyond the scope of this article.
244. See generally Edwards, supra note 230. For this reason, it would be useful to
study factors associated with judges' belief in mediation. Although there have been
studies ofjudges' opinions about ADR, see, for example, Folberg et al., supra note 227,
it would be helpful to do multivariate analyses to better understand the logic of the
judges' thinking.
245. See Act of Mar. 18, 1999, §1, 1999 Ark. Laws 704.

HeinOnline -- 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 221 2000

HarvardNegotiation Law Review

[Vol. 5:137

Resolution Association is developing a strategy to promote such
court-ordered mediation primarily through contacts with lawyers and
especially judges. 24 6 The Association of Family and Conciliation
Courts sponsored two colloquiua on child protection and dependency
mediation that highlighted the importance of getting the backing of
the juvenile court judges to get approval and continuing support for
dependency mediation programs. Santa Clara County (California)
Judge Leonard Edwards, a longtime leader in the field, highlighted
the importance of having professionals talk with others in the same
profession. He has found that judges are most persuasive to other
judges, lawyers for other lawyers, child protection officials with other
such officials and so on.24 7 This study supports the logic of these
strategies.
C.

Cautions About Institutionalizationof Mediation

While belief in mediation seems to be fairly widespread among
business lawyers and executives like those in this study, this belief
may not be extremely deep. It is relatively easy for a respondent to
tell a researcher that mediation should be used often; it requires
something more to act on that belief in the face of other influences. It
is worth noting that most respondents in this survey had relatively
limited experience with ADR during careers that spanned a median
of 11-12 years for the attorneys and 22 years for the executives. During that time, only 32% of the outside counsel, 13% of the inside counsel, and 2% of the executives had participated as a partisan in more
than 20 ADR proceedings. Almost two-thirds of the executives (62%)
had no experience as a partisan in ADR at all. Certainly it is not
necessary to have a lot of experience to believe in mediation. Indeed,
after one or two positive experiences, some people may become "true
believers" and proselytize its use quite broadly. Nonetheless, most
respondents' limited ADR experience could raise doubts about the
depth of commitment to their beliefs in mediation, on the theory that
if they were truly committed to mediation, they would have decided
or recommended to use it more often.
This is difficult to analyze because no one in these business disputes can make decisions unilaterally. If mediation is not ordered by
246. See Arkansas Conflict Resolution Association membership meeting (Aug. 21,
1999). See also Selling ADR to Judges, Annual Conference of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (Oct. 15, 1998).
247. Leonard Edwards, Remarks made at Luncheon Speech, Child Protection and
Dependency Mediation Colloquium, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts
(Apr. 17, 1999).
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a court, attorneys are dependent on clients' willingness to mediate,
executives are dependent on attorneys presenting ADR procedures as
plausible options, and each side in a dispute is dependent on the
other's interest in mediation. Having said all that, the limited use of
ADR leaves lingering questions about the depth of individual and organizational belief in mediation.
If key decision-makers are not truly committed to mediation, procedures described in Part VIII.B may not be effective in institutionalizing mediation. Parties and attorneys who do not believe in
mediation can certainly find ways to evade and subvert mandates for
consultations about ADR and attendance at mediations. They can
"go through the motions" of having consultations and attending mediations without seriously intending to consider ADR or to engage in
mediated negotiations. Thus, while such requirements may be helpful in institutionalizing mediation, they are certainly no guarantee
that parties and attorneys will follow them faithfully. 248
However deep the commitment to mediation of those who have
"gotten the faith," mediation proponents should be concerned about
key decision-makers keeping the faith. While mediation may be
"trendy" today, it may well be replaced or supplanted by some new
dispute resolution fashion.2 9 While it appears that ADR is still in
vogue as of this writing, there is no guarantee that it will remain so
indefinitely. With the rapid pace of change in today's highly developed world, we have lived through de-institutionalization of icons
that were widely seen as permanent fixtures in their day. In business, consider that IBM and AT&T were once considered virtually
monopolistic titans. While these companies still exist today, they are
now mere shadows of their former selves, and it would not be surprising if they became swallowed up entirely in a future merger or acquisition. In politics, although President George Bush had astronomical
approval ratings in the public opinion polls after the Persian Gulf
War and was considered by many to be a "shoo-in" for re-election, he
was not re-elected. Newsweek magazine's "conventional wisdom
248. Kimberlee Kovach has proposed the establishment of a good faith requirement for participation in mediation. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good Faith,Disp. RESOL., Winter 1997, at 9. While I
am sympathetic to the goal of her proposal, I am skeptical that it would be effective
and I worry that it would be counterproductive. See Edward F. Sherman, 'Good Faith'
Participationin Mediation:Aspirational,Not Mandatory, Disp. REsOL., Winter 1997,
at 14.
249. See text accompanying note 125, supra (relating an attorney's observation
that ADR was trendy recently but has been "replaced by some newer and trendier set
of initials").
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watch" feature is a weekly reminder of the fickleness of public opinion. One could go on and on about the "here today, gone tomorrow"
life cycle of many prominent institutions. This study finds that some
of the strongest and most direct correlates of belief in mediation are
perceptions of the views of corporate executives and organizational
superiors, as well as effects on business relationships. Views of mediation by executives-who typically have little or no personal experience with mediation-could easily change. Thus, if mediation or
ADR eventually turns out to be the dispute resolution equivalent of
the hula hoop, one should not be too surprised.
My hunch is that mediation won't be a dispute resolution hula
hoop, at least in the near term. I expect that mediation will continue
to grow, at least for a while, because it is flexible enough to address
the interests of key decision-makers in disputes, particularly in comparison with its primary rivals, litigation and arbitration. In a highly
competitive global economy, businesses are likely to continue to value
maintaining good relationships with commercial partners and individual customers alike. Mediation clearly has greater potential for
preserving relationships than litigation and arbitration. Mediation
also has the potential to provide cheaper and faster resolution of disputes and to tailor the timing of the process to the needs of the parties and attorneys. It also has the potential to provide results that
participants believe are fair.2 50 The perceived failure of litigation to
perform well in this respect is the heart of the criticism of litigation
by the executives in this study.2 51 This study finds, like most other
surveys of mediation users, that the vast majority are highly satisfied
customers. 2 52 Thus, mediation has the potential to provide better
and more efficient performance than its competitors, which could
prompt people to maintain or increase their use of mediation.
I keep referring to the potential of mediation because "it" is extremely malleable and it is quite possible-perhaps even likely-that
processes called "mediation" will evolve over time. For one thing, "it"
250. See Esser, supra note 2, at 529, 532-533. The RAND Report found that litigants and especially the attorneys in mediation generally believe that the outcome
and process of mediation was fair in their cases. KAKAMK Er AL., supra note 119, at

369, 404. The attorneys and litigants whose cases were not mediated gave responses
that were not significantly different from those who went through mediation. See id.
at 305-10.
251. See Lande, FailingFaith, supra note 95, at 26-35. This study suggests that
executives' dissatisfaction with litigation is significantly based on doubts about the
ability of litigation to reasonably find the truth. If people believe that mediation fairly
gets at the truth, this could be a factor related to belief in mediation. This was not
measured in this study or any other I have seen.
252. See Esser, supra note 2, at 529, 532-533; McEwen, supra note 2, at 182.
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is currently a collection of various procedures in diverse settings with
some common features and a lot of variability.253 Studies of other
institutionalization processes suggest that there are likely to be "isomorphic" pressures that might lead to the dominance of certain forms
of mediation and perhaps the extinction of others as the mediation
field becomes increasingly standardized. 25 The 1980s and 1990s
saw the proliferation of "standards of practice" for mediation and
ADR. 2 s5 At this writing, a Uniform Mediation Act and a Model Rule
of Professional Conduct for Lawyer-Mediators are being drafted. 2 6
These and future efforts at regulation are likely to increase the standardization and decrease the diversity of mediation practices. In
many ways, I believe that such standardization, if done wisely, would
be a good thing. It should reduce the incidence of poor mediation
practices, improve communication between mediation buyers and
sellers, and provide for more predictable interactions and results
from mediation.
The push for standardization can also produce some undesirable
effects that are essentially the "flip side of the same coin." As the
mediation field settles into a smaller number of legitimate patterns,
it may become increasingly difficult to innovate. Some of the difficulty may be due to regulatory limitations, though probably more of it
will come from normal organizational dynamics. As mediation becomes a routine way to handle substantial volumes of cases, there
may be little perceived need, incentive, or legitimacy to consider alternatives. Over time, practices may be perpetuated simply because
253. For a minimalist definition of mediation, see Lande, supra note 1, at 839 n.1.
For a description of some of the variation in mediation styles and goals, see id., at
845-57. See also MOORE, supra note 13, at 41-53 (outlining typology of mediation,
including "social network," "independent," and three varieties of "authoritative' mediation: "benevolent," "administrative! managerial," and "vested interest" mediation).
254. See generally, DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 59. For a fascinating study
illustrating the standardization of practices in venture capital financing of Silicon
Valley computer businesses, see Suchman, supra note 54.
255. For a collection of several sets of such standards, including the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators adopted by the American Bar Association, American
Arbitration Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, see
MARK D. BENNLrr & hcICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE Arr OF MEDIATION 159-185 (1996).
256. See Section of Dispute Resolution, American Bar Association & National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws, Uniform Mediation Act (visited
Sept. 1, 1999) <http:/Avww.stanford.edu/group/sccn/mediation/>; CPR-Georgetown
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, ProposedModel Rule of Professional
Conduct for The Lawyer as Third Party Neutral (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http'/
www.cpradr.orglcpr-georgelitml>. For other indicators of trends toward standardization of mediation, see Lande, FailingFaith,supra note 95, at 62-63.
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"that's the way they have been done around here," rather than because the practices satisfy the interests of the parties or mediation
program sponsors. 2 5 7 This tendency to rely on shortcut routines may
be aggravated if there are pressures to speed up handling of an ongoing volume of cases with limited resources. A speed-up accompanied
by routinization is especially likely to occur in court-sponsored programs, given the (current) limited political support in the U.S. for
government spending and a general tendency of government programs to be regulated by a set of rigid legal regulations. Under such
circumstances, careful individualized attention to parties and cases
may give way to impersonal mass production of mediation services
that do not provide the benefits that mediation processes originally
offered. Indeed, over time, mass-produced mediation, particularly
when done in the context of litigation, may come to resemble litigation so much that "it" loses its distinctive quality as an alternative to
"normal" litigation. 258 The history of arbitration in the twentieth
century provides a cautionary example of how dispute resolution innovations can become so rigidified and legalized as to lose their perceived advantages. 25 9 If institutionalization of mediation takes a
similar course, one can expect that the next generation will look for
alternatives to alternative dispute resolution and its current "rising
star," mediation.
Thus, for key supporters of mediation to maintain belief in mediation, mediation program administrators and mediation proponents
need to be regularly attentive to evolving interests and circumstances
and prepared to change mediation practices accordingly. This may be
a difficult challenge if key supporters are unwilling to consider
changes because they are stuck on a particular institutionalized form
of mediation, or if they lose so much faith in mediation that they
would prefer to adopt a new innovation rather than fix problems with
257. See Tolbert & Zucker, supra note 65, at 22 (arguing that after innovations
become institutionalized, continuation is based more on the innovations' value in providing legitimacy than improving performance).
258. See Lande, supra note 1, at 845-49 (describing "liti-mediation" culture where
"it has become taken for granted that mediation is the normal way of ending litigation"); Lande, FailingFaith,supra note 95, at 64 (arguing that if ADR becomes sufficiently integrated into litigation, ADR may lose its distinctive advantages, possibly
prompting loss of confidence in both ADR and litigation).
259. See Lande, FailingFaith, supra note 95, at 62 n.183. In this study, I also
asked respondents how often they believe that binding arbitration is appropriate in
lawsuits involving a business. All three types of respondents had less belief in arbitration than in mediation, especially both types of attorneys, who have been particularly soured on arbitration.
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mediation as it has become institutionalized. 260 I believe that it is
possible to maintain openness to new innovations within mediation
practices if mediation practitioners and programs incorporate effective quality control systems. 26 1 Experience with institutionalization
of other ideas, practices, and ideologies suggests that mediation proponents should be humble and realistic in expectations of overcoming
predictable rigidification that is often part of institutionalization
processes.
IX.

CONCLUSION

This study suggests that business attorneys' and executives' belief in mediation is on an ideological, not simply a technical, level.
These professionals identify themselves in such categories as skeptics, believers, and advocates. While technical characteristics of rival
dispute resolution procedures certainly factor into the professionals'
ideologies, it seems clear that the ideologies transcend rational technical analyses of optimal modes of handling disputes. Rather, belief
in mediation takes on the character of a moral value. For believers, it
represents a "best practice," not only in producing technically superior outcomes but of being the "right thing to do."
In Part HA, I suggested that there is a "process pluralist" ideology and that a key element of this ideology is the belief in the legitimacy of a multiplicity of disputing procedures such as mediation,
arbitration, and a host of procedures specific to particular organizations and industries as well as to litigation in government courts.
From the data in the present study, it is hard to assess the extent to
which respondents hold such an ideology. Thinking about how one
might measure the ideology is helpful in trying to conceptualize the
essence of it-and even whether any such coherent ideology really
exists at all. For example, to establish such an ideology, must belief
in mediation be correlated with belief in arbitration? (It turns out
260. The ADR movement itself is, to some extent, an example of an effort to adopt
an innovation rather than fix underlying problems with the court system. Similarly,
a shift in popularity from arbitration to mediation is another example of abandonment (by some) of an old innovation in favor of a new one.
261. I agree with Sharon Press, Director of the Florida Dispute Resolution Center,
who warns against "ossification" of what should be the flexible process of mediation
and argues that authorities have an ongoing obligation to routinely and systematically review their policies, rules, and procedures. See Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteurof Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rsv. 903, 910 (1997). Even if
these are kept current, institutionalization poses the risk that, over time, official answers to qsuestions will simply be, 'That's what the rule says-we have no flexibility
in this area." Id. at 916.
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that the correlation is not statistically significant for the respondents
in this study. 2 62 ) That seems too rigid a measure, as people may have
different relative preferences for various dispute resolution procedures but still generally agree that there are a variety of procedures
that may be appropriate in various cases. For example, the attorneys
(especially outside counsel) in this study tend to believe in mediation
more than the executives, who tend to believe in arbitration more
than the attorneys. Nonetheless, all three types of respondents believe that both procedures are frequently appropriate, which seems to
get closer to the heart of such an ideology. Does the openness to a
multiplicity of dispute resolution procedures require acceptance of
the full panoply of procedures, including relatively rare or esoteric
species such as summary jury trials, med-arb, and baseball arbitration? To be a process pluralist, must one accept litigation as a legitimate dispute resolution procedure?2 63 Going beyond acceptance of
diverse dispute resolution procedures, does process pluralism require
acceptance of plural norms, remedies, professional roles, or negotiation styles,2 6 as I suggested at the outset?
These questions are beyond answer in the present study. For
one thing, if such a complex ideology exists, it is more likely to exist
among ADR professionals than business lawyers and executives, as
ADR is not a central concern for the latter. Even among ADR professionals, there is such diversity of opinion within the ADR field at this
intermediate stage of institutionalization that a widely shared and
coherent ideology may not have coalesced yet. If such an ideology
does coalesce and diffuse through society, it may have an important
impact on organizational and professional life as well as the operation of the legal system. Thus, it bears further scrutiny.
Whether or not a complex process pluralist ideology now exists
(or is in the process of coalescing), this study shows that a simpler
ideology favoring use of mediation does exist and is widely held
among business lawyers and executives. Is belief in mediation like
belief in magic or the market? The notion of faith suggests a powerful acceptance that is very difficult, if not impossible, to shake. Listening to the attorneys and executives interviewed for this study (as
262. For this purpose, belief in arbitration is defined similarly as belief in mediation, i.e., how often arbitration is considered to be appropriate in disputes involving a
business.
263. If so, most executives in this study need not apply. See Lande, FailingFaith,
supra note 95, at 51-52.
264. In particular, does it require acceptance of-or preference for-interest-based
approaches to negotiation?
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well as speakers at professional gatherings and in informal conversations), there clearly is a substantial minority of lawyers who identify
as "true believers," with a strong faith in the value of mediation. This
study suggests that this group may constitute 15 to 40 percent of the
attorneys, depending on how faith is defined and which set of attorneys is involved.2 6 5 Whether such faith in mediation (or magic, God,
or the market) is justified-or is a convenient ilusion-depends on
the perspective of the observer. We cannot know whether faith in
and practice of mediation in the future will have the staying power
that magic, God, the market, or hula hoops have had. For the institution of mediation to persist over an extended time, presumably there
need not be a consensus or even a majority of key actors with strong
faith in mediation, only a critical mass.
Perpetuation of the institution also probably requires a larger
body of believers who sustain some belief, albeit weaker and more
qualified than the true believers. At this point (or at least when the
interviews for this study were conducted), most attorneys and executives seemed to have this weaker form of belief in mediation. Will
these qualified believers become converts to a faith in mediation, lose
whatever confidence they now have, or pretty much hold pat? This
study suggests that the flow of signals about mediation through professional and organizational networks is likely to be critical in future
diffusion (or contraction) of the ideology and the intensity of belief of
its adherents. Recent trends of institutionalization of mediation at
this moment in history seem encouraging for proponents of mediation. This study suggests approaches that mediation proponents
might use to extend the institutionalization of mediation. Experience
with institutionalization of other practices suggests that proponents
should be careful to avoid the dysfunctions that frequently accompany "successful" institutionalizations.

265.

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX 1

As noted in Part III, supra, respondents were selected from four
states and those states were selected based on measures of the
strength of the "ADR culture" of the states. Florida was considered to
be a state with a "strong ADR culture" whereas Pennsylvania and
Tennessee were considered to have "weak ADR cultures." 26 6 Thus,
the results of the statistical analyses were the initial ratings of state
ADR culture. The survey results support experts' observations of distinguishable state mediation cultures, though not a general state
ADR culture. 26 7 The Floridians in the survey believe that mediation
is appropriate more often than do residents of the other states. Sixtysix percent of Florida residents said that mediation is appropriate in
more than half of cases (see Table 12). This compares with 51% of
Massachusetts residents, 45% of Tennessee residents, and 41% of
Pennsylvania residents giving these responses. Like Florida, Massachusetts was considered to have a strong ADR culture. The average
response for Florida residents is significantly greater than for Tennessee and Pennsylvania residents. The average for Massachusetts
residents is in between those for Florida on the high end and Tennessee and Pennsylvania on the low end, but not significantly different
from these three states. This suggests that Massachusetts might be
better described as having a medium mediation culture. Since this
research did not find that Florida or Massachusetts residents displayed greater belief in arbitration than residents of Pennsylvania
266. For description of the procedure for initially assessing strength of state ADR
culture, see Lande, FailingFaith,supra note 95, at 69-70.
267. As noted in Part III, supra, the notion of ADR culture has been used as a
device to select respondents and control for statewide geographical differences.
Although some of the findings of this research are consistent with the designations of
mediation culture, based on these results it is impossible to say what differences between the states account for different attitudes. Part of this uncertainty may reflect
confusion about definitions of mediation (or ADR or legal) culture. Kritzer and
Zemans, supra note 95, at 538, note that the definition of local legal culture might (or
might not) incorporate norms and attitudes that grow out of formal rules and structural factors (such as caseload characteristics) as well as "residual" beliefs not traceable to rules or structures. Observed geographical differences in attitudes and
behavior about mediation could reflect variations in any or all of these classes of factors. Indeed, whether the determinative factors might be considered as "cultural" is
itself uncertain at this point. What we can say now with some confidence is that these
findings are consistent with a mediation culture hypothesis, and that the multivariate
analyses controlling for these geographical differences enhance confidences in other
independent variables, explaining the observed variation. See Lande, Ideology of Disputing,supra note 95, at 182-83. Recognizing the uncertainty about the nature of the
geographical differences as structural or cultural, they will nonetheless be referred to
as mediation culture for convenience.
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and Tennessee, it would be more accurate to refer to this phenomenon as mediation culture rather than ADR culture.
Table 12. Belief in Mediation by State
Proportion of cases

Florida

Mass.

Tennessee

Penn.

Total

Less than half*

11

23

23

24

21

Half*

23

26

32

35

29

More than half*

66

51

45

41

50

Total

100

100

100

100

100

Average (on scale
from 0 to 10)

6.9

6.0

5.5

5.5

5.9

Number of
respondents

44

47

47

51

189

*percentage of respondents saying that mediation is appropriate in various proportions of
lawsuits involving a business
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